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This Article makes several boldly novel claims. It presents
an original understanding of the United States Constitution
that seems to have been forgotten. This understanding is predicated on the assumption that the national government is a sovereign government and that Congress, as a sovereign legislature, possesses the legislative powers that sovereign
legislatures possess. I call this theory inherent national sover-
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eignty constitutionalism. This theory of the Constitution defined “enumerated powers” not only semantically, but as a list
of powers the Constitution delegates to Congress and to which
Congress is limited. Adherents of inherent national sovereignty
also understood “enumerated powers” as a statement of ends
and objects for which Congress may exercise its inherent legislative powers. In addition to the enumerated powers of Article
I, the inherent national sovereignty theory also understood the
Constitution’s Preamble and other clauses that might require
federal action as additional delegations of ends and objects that
authorize the federal government to exercise its inherent legislative powers to achieve.
According to the inherent national sovereignty theory,
Congress, like the British Parliament after which it was somewhat modeled, possesses the primary authority to interpret the
Constitution, including the scope of its legislative powers and
the discretion of when and how to exercise them. Proponents of
this theory consequently understood the Constitution as a dynamically evolving framework of government whose meaning
would develop over time through the political process and the
specific actions taken by Congress and the executive branch of
the federal government. When the meaning of a constitutional
clause or power was disputed or was ambiguous, advocates of
inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism looked to Congress to resolve the dispute or to clarify the ambiguity by interpreting the disputed text in accord with other clauses of the
Constitution and/or relevant political practice. Ultimately,
however, the people are the final authority and arbiters of constitutional meaning, as this understanding is predicated on the
theory of popular sovereignty.
The inherent national sovereignty theory of American constitutionalism relegated the Supreme Court to a secondary,
deferential role in interpreting constitutional meaning and the
scope of constitutional powers. Its role was to affirm the constitutionality of congressional laws unless Congress’s action is explicitly prohibited or explicitly reserved to the states or to the
people. The Court, in the words of Chief Justice John Marshall,
was authorized to void an act of Congress only if the act was a
1
“bold and plain usurpation” of legislative power. In the opinion
credited with creating the Supreme Court’s power of judicial
review, Marbury v. Madison, the Chief Justice repeatedly spoke

1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
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of a congressional act as “repugnant” to the Constitution before
2
the Constitution authorized the Court to void the act. Indeed,
the Chief grounded the Court’s power of judicial review, in part,
on a theory of inherent judicial power when he stated that “[i]t
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart3
ment to say what the law is.”
The nature of inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism just described appears to be oxymoronic. The ideas of inherent powers and constitutionally delegated powers appear to
be mutually exclusive. How can a government possess inherent
powers and also be limited to delegated powers? Even proponents of inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism readily acknowledged that the United States government is a government of limited powers, of constitutionally delegated
powers. They reconciled these two apparently irreconcilable
ideas by limiting the federal government’s authority to exercise
inherent sovereign powers to those that are appropriate to
achieve the objects and ends delegated to the federal government in the enumerated powers of Article I, the Preamble, and
other clauses in the Constitution.
Proponents of inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism asserted this understanding of the Constitution in support
of congressional legislation that was opposed by advocates of
another “original” understanding of American Constitutionalism. Many early Americans asserted a states’ rights oriented,
strict construction constitutionalism and insisted that the
meaning of the Constitution’s text is fixed and should be strictly interpreted to limit the powers of the national government to
those that are enumerated in Article I and those unenumerated
powers required to carry enumerated powers into effect. It is
this strict construction constitutionalism that today’s “new
originalists” claim to be the original understanding of the Con4
stitution.
But the assertion of inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism in the political and legislative debates in our early
history over the meaning of the Constitution and how and by
whom the Constitution should be interpreted is irrefutable evidence that strict construction constitutionalism was not the on2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138, 176, 177, 180 (1803).
3. Id. at 177.
4. There is substantial scholarly literature on the New Originalism. See
for example the works cited in the papers published in Symposium, The New
Originalism in Constitutional Law, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (2013).
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ly original understanding of the Constitution. Today’s “new
originalists” use a theory of constitutional construction that is
founded on an assumption that is contradicted by the historical
evidence presented within, namely, that they are embracing an
understanding of the Constitution that was the general understanding of the Constitution. Moreover, proponents of inherent
national sovereignty constitutionalism often won these constitutional debates. Indeed, the Federalist Party of Alexander
Hamilton, the principal initial proponents of inherent national
sovereignty constitutionalism, dominated the federal government from 1789 to 1800, and their theory of the Constitution
was adopted in Congress and embraced by the Supreme Court
on occasions long after they ceased to exist.
This Article will demonstrate that early Congresses and
presidential administrations asserted the inherent national
sovereignty theory and applied it as constitutional authority for
actual decisions they made and actions they took by examining
the debates around Congress’s incorporation of the First and
Second Banks of the United States. Proponents of these corporations rejected opponents’ argument that Congress, as a legislature whose powers are limited to those enumerated in Article
I, semantically understood, does not possess the power of incorporation because this power is not expressly or even impliedly
delegated to Congress. Bank proponents answered that Congress, as a sovereign legislature, possesses the power of incorporation as one of the sovereign powers that inheres in all sovereign governments. However, bank proponents acknowledged
that Congress may exercise this power only to achieve the ends
or objects delegated to it by the Constitution. They thereby reconciled the government’s inherent sovereign powers with the
theory that its powers are limited to those delegated by the
Constitution. They consequently distinguished the federal government as a government of limited powers from the sovereign
governments of other nation-states that are authorized to exercise their sovereign powers generally, without such limitations.
The research on which this Article is based yields another
striking revelation regarding the validity of original understandings of the Constitution, namely, that constitutional interpretations were as much an expression of economic, financial, geographical, and political interests as they were
intellectual commitments to textual meanings and constitutional values. This will be seen in the interpretations of specific
individuals and groups, such as James Madison and the Demo-
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cratic Republican Party that he, with Thomas Jefferson, founded, as well as Hamilton’s Federalists, who asserted or opposed
constitutional interpretations at one moment in time and then
adopted opposite interpretations at a later time when the
change served their interests. The practical necessity for congressional action to meet a particular national need or a desired national objective often determined individuals’ understandings of the Constitution and of congressional power; at
times practical necessity overrode individuals’ doubts regarding
the Constitution’s delegation of legislative authority for a particular action. The evidence presented in this Article strongly
suggests that, when the federal government was up and running and political decisions had to be made, original understandings of the Constitution served as political arguments to
support or to oppose specific interests more than they reflected
principled interpretations of constitutional meanings. The manipulation of constitutional meaning to advance individual and
group interests raises serious doubts regarding the propriety
and validity of binding contemporary interpretations of constitutional texts to their assumed original understandings.
This Article examines certain political actions of the founding generation and its immediate successors that reveal how
these historical actors interpreted and applied the Constitution
in actually governing the new nation. It focuses on the debates
leading to the incorporation of the First Bank of the United
States in 1791, its expiration in 1810–11, the incorporation of
the Second Bank of the United States in 1815–16, and the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland upholding
Congress’s inherent sovereign power of incorporation in 1819.
These debates present case studies of how the members of the
three branches of the U.S. government understood the process
of constitutional government, the role of constitutional interpretation in this governing process, Congress as the primary
authority to interpret the Constitution, and how the federal
government exercised constitutional power in actually governing.
This Article also contends that Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, which many scholars
consider to be the most important opinion in the U.S. Supreme
5
Court’s history, has been misinterpreted by scholars and the
5. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Story of McCulloch: Banking on National Power, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 33 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2009)
(reporting that McCulloch was cited in over 2400 cases as of January 1, 2009).
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Court. The constitutional theories expressed in the political debates relating to the incorporation of the two national banks
presented in this Article have been overlooked by scholars and
by jurists, but this Article demonstrates that they are indispensable to an accurate understanding of Marshall’s opinion and
the Court’s decision in McCulloch. Placed in the context of these debates, one can see that Chief Justice Marshall and the
unanimous Supreme Court adopted the inherent national sovereignty theory of the Constitution and affirmed Congress’s
power of incorporation as one of its inherent sovereign powers
that bank proponents had successfully argued in Congress to
support the incorporation of the national banks.
Part I of this Article reviews the congressional debates over
Congress’s power to incorporate the First Bank in 1791. Part II
recounts the debate in President George Washington’s cabinet
among Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Randolph, and Alexander
Hamilton. Part III analyzes the congressional debates relating
to the failed effort to extend the Bank’s charter in 1810–11.
Part IV analyzes the congressional debates over the incorporation of the Second Bank in 1815–16 and President James Madison’s support for this measure. Part V examines the lawyers’
arguments and Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch
v. Maryland.
I. THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES &
CONGRESS 1791
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S BANK
OF THE UNITED STATES
To understand the constitutional significance of the First
and Second Banks of the United States, one must know something of their joint governmentally and privately owned corporate structures, the roles they were to play in the nation’s economic and financial sectors, and the political divisions relating
to them. The First Bank of the United States was proposed by
Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury during President George Washington’s first administration, in December
1790. It was part of Hamilton’s economic plan, endorsed by the
Federalists, to develop the United States into a powerful commercial and prosperous mixed economy. Subsistence and commercial farming were the primary economic activities at the
time. Hamilton’s economic plan was designed to develop the
manufacturing, financial, and commercial sectors of the econo-

2016]

INHERENT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

707

6

my and to secure a system of public credit.
A national banking industry hardly existed in 1790 when
7
Hamilton proposed the national bank. Only four commercial
banks existed in the U.S. at the time: the Bank of North America in Philadelphia, chartered by the Continental Congress in
1781, and state-chartered banks in New York City, Boston, and
8
Baltimore. Most Americans were unfamiliar with banks, how
they functioned, and the roles they could play in a dynamic,
9
capitalist economy. But Hamilton understood a national bank’s
importance to the development of the American economy and
10
the financial operations of the national government.
Hamilton explained how banks could increase the sum of
circulating money beyond its capital in specie and thereby in11
crease the active capital of the nation. In expanding the nation’s money supply, banks generated employment, expanded
labor and industry, and promoted the production of goods for
export, which, in turn, generated a favorable balance of trade
and consequent increase in the nation’s quantity of gold and
12
silver. A national bank, Hamilton argued, could thereby “enlarge the mass of industrious and commercial enterprise [and
assist them to] become nurseries of national wealth”—a “consequence as satisfactorily verified by experience, as it is clearly

6. See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 114–15 (1957); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815–1846, at 3–27 (1991); GORDON
S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–
1815, at 98–99 (2009).
7. See HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 114.
8. WOOD, supra note 6, at 98.
9. Id.
10. See HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 114.
11. See WOOD, supra note 6, at 98.
12. LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 15–30 (compiled by M. St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall, 1832). The debates of the U.S. Senate were not recorded and are not known. The compilers of this legislative and
documentary history claim they collected “the entire proceedings, debates, and
resolutions,” of both houses of Congress, concerning the national bank, including reports of committees and public officers relating to the establishment,
constitutionality, and public uses of the bank. Id. at iii. They explain that, to
the extent a record of the proceedings and debates exists at all, “it is in the
pages of the gazettes of the day.” Id. For these proceedings and debates the
compilers relied on the files of the NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER, which they assert furnish “the most correct sources of information.” Id. at iv. Nevertheless,
they did not include the Senate debates relating to the bank bill.
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deducible in theory.”
A bank was also useful to the government in acquiring cap14
ital, especially in sudden emergencies, Hamilton continued. A
bank would facilitate the payment of taxes by extending loans
15
to taxpayers who needed them. It would be the sole depository
of government funds, but it would also hold deposits of private
individuals, both of which enabled the First Bank to create a
circulating medium of exchange, or paper money, in the form of
promissory notes payable to bearer based on the bank’s depos16
its. A bank’s capacity to increase the quantity of money would
not only assist individuals in paying taxes, it would also assist
them in satisfying their other monetary needs and help them in
17
any business in which “money is an agent.” It would also enable the government “to answer any exigencies” arising in the
18
foreign trade of merchants and other enterprises. A national
bank would serve the commercial interests of the nation as well
19
as the financial needs of the U.S. government.
The First Bank would be jointly owned by the U.S. gov20
ernment and private investors. Jointly owned and govern21
ment-subsidized enterprises were common in the early U.S.
States owned and even operated banks they chartered, and
they often owned shares in and bought the bonds of turnpike
companies, canal companies, insurance companies, and rail22
roads. State ownership of companies declined shortly before
the Civil War as their investments turned sour in the wake of

13. Id. at 17.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191–96.
17. Clarke & Hall, supra note 12, at 18.
18. Id. at 23.
19. Id.
20. WOOD, supra note 6, at 98.
21. See STUART BRUCHEY, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH,
1607–1861, at 112–40 (1968); LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 1776–1860, at 82–104 (1948); JOHN
LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND
THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 6
(2001); HARRY N. SCHEIBER, OHIO CANAL ERA: A CASE STUDY OF GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY, 1820–1861, at 296 (1969); GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR,
THE TRANSPORTATION REVOLUTION, 1815–1860, at 92–96 (1951); RICHARD
WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA 26–27 (2011).
22. See BRUCHEY, supra note 21; LARSON, supra note 21; TAYLOR, supra
note 21.
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the economic depression of 1837. The national government also financed and subsidized companies engaged in water and
24
land transportation, such as steamboats and railroads. The
national government heavily subsidized railroad development
25
before and after the Civil War.
Returning to the First Bank, the U.S. government contributed one-fifth of the bank’s capital of $10 million and owned
one-fifth of the outstanding stock; private investors bought the
26
remaining four-fifths of the outstanding stock. The latter were
authorized to acquire up to three-fourths of the stock with government securities, but they were required to pay for the re27
maining one-fourth with gold or silver.
The First Bank was chartered for a period of twenty
28
years. The bank was located in Philadelphia, but it was au29
thorized to establish branches in other cities. The First Bank
30
eventually established branches in eight other cities.
B. THE BANK BILL IN THE U.S. SENATE 1791
Unfortunately, the Senate debates relating to the Senate’s
adoption of the bank bill were not recorded. The bill was reported to the Senate on January 3, 1791, and it was debated
31
over the next two and one-half weeks. Senator William
Maclay commented on the senate debates in his diary, but his
32
entries are not very detailed. He mentioned that the issue of
Congress’s authority to charter the bank might have been inquired into, but apparently Congress’s authority was not an issue since “the old [Continental] Congress enjoyed” and exercised this authority when it chartered the Bank of North

23. See LARSON, supra note 21, at 195–224.
24. See id. at 109–48.
25. See WHITE, supra note 21.
26. WOOD, supra note 6, at 98.
27. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, § 2, 3 Stat. 191, 192.
28. WOOD, supra note 6, at 98.
29. Id.
30. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 127. Branches were opened in Boston,
New York, Baltimore, and Charleston in 1792; Norfolk, Virginia in 1800;
Washington, D.C. and Savannah in 1802; and New Orleans in 1805. Id.
31. See The Diary of William Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates
(March 4, 1789–March 3, 1781), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 355, 356–65 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988).
32. See id.
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33

America in 1781. This suggests that senators assumed legislative precedent determined issues of constitutional construction,
a doctrine of national sovereignty constitutionalism. Maclay also noted that there was a group of senators, whom he dubbed
“[t]he Potowmack interest,” who sought to destroy the bank bill
because they feared that the bank, “in the hands of the Philadelphians, might retard the removal of Congress” to a location
34
on the Potomac River. This entry reveals another aspect of
constitutional construction in the early republic: economic, geographical, and partisan interests shaped views of the Constitution perhaps as much as commitment to constitutional principles. The Senate passed the bank bill on January 20, 1791,
35
without a roll call and sent it to the House of Representatives.
C. THE BANK BILL IN THE HOUSE
1. Economic and Geographical Interests and the First Bank
The House debates are recorded in the Annals of Congress.
However, organized as a committee of the whole, the House
considered the bank bill without anyone rising in opposition
until Representative James Jackson of Georgia, who opposed
36
the bill, asked the House to recommit the bill to committee.
His opposition confirmed the observation made by Representative Michael Stone of Maryland later in the debates that individuals were influenced in their views of government policy by
“habits of thinking by our local situations, and, perhaps, the
37
distinct interests of the States we represent.” Consequently,
opinions regarding the constitutionality of this bill, Representative Stone opined, “seem to be divided by a geographical
line,” and “other considerations [are] mixed with the [bank]
question,” such as the future location of the capitol and the
ways in which the general government affected the economic
38
interests of different groups. Stone then confirmed his obser-

33. Id. at 347.
34. Id. at 364.
35. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 116.
36. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1891 (1791) (statement of Rep. Jackson).
37. Id. at 1930 (statement of Rep. Stone).
38. Id.; see also id. at 1891 (statement of Rep. Jackson) (arguing that a
national bank would only benefit the mercantile class). Southerners feared
that a national bank located in Philadelphia might become an insurmountable
obstacle to their desire to move the nation’s capitol to the Potomac River. See
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 229 (1993);
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vation by opposing the bank bill, in part, because a national
bank would “give ‘partial advantages’ to the States,” contrary to
39
the Constitution. He also objected that it would create a moneyed interest “at the devotion of Government” and that it would
40
“swallow up the State banks.”
The economic interests of Representative Jackson’s constituents led him to oppose the bank bill, and evidently informed his constitutional arguments. Jackson argued that the
Bank would benefit only a small portion of the American popu41
lation: the mercantile elite. Farmers and yeomanry, such as
42
his constituents, would benefit not at all. Jackson correctly
identified the intended beneficiaries of the First Bank; he was
also correct in asserting that the First Bank would not benefit
43
farmers. Representative William Giles of Virginia also opposed the bank, in part because it favored Philadelphia over
other port cities in violation of the provision in the Constitution
that prohibits giving any preference by the regulation of com44
merce or revenue to the ports of one state over another.
Scholars have long recognized that economic and geographical interests shaped partisan interests which significantly influenced how the Constitution was interpreted as well as the
constitutional positions legislators argued regarding the bank
45
bill. The House votes on chartering the First Bank reflected

Kenneth R. Bowling, The Bank Bill, The Capital City and President Washington, in 1 CAPITOL STUDIES NO. 1, at 59 (1972). However, Benjamin B. Klubes
rejects this view in The First Federal Congress and the First National Bank: A
Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 10 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 19, 27 n.19
(1990).
39. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1936 (1791) (statement of Rep. Stone).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1891 (statement of Rep. Jackson).
42. Id. For a discussion of the question whether the bank would favor special interests or the nation’s general welfare, see infra, notes 233–44 and accompanying text .
43. See WOOD, supra note 6, at 99 (stating that the bank did not want to
make short-term mortgage loans to farmers); 2 DUMAS MALONE, Jefferson and
the Rights of Man, in JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 340 (1951) (stating that the
doubts farmers had about the bank were borne out by experience).
44. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1940 (1791) (statement of Rep. Giles). The clause
in the Constitution Representative Giles was referring to is Article I, Section
9, Clause 6, which states in relevant part: “No Preference shall be given by
any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of
another.”
45. See HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 115–18; Charles A. Beard, Historiography and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 159, 161–
66 (Conyers Read ed., 1938); Klubes, supra note 38, at 20–28.
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geographical groupings. Of the thirty-nine votes in favor of the
bank, thirty-three were from the states comprising New England and the states of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, states with the largest commercial cities and the greatest
46
proportion of incipient manufactures. Fifteen of the twenty
votes against the bank bill came from the states of Virginia,
North and South Carolina, and Georgia, states that remained
47
mostly rural and local. It is also important to remember that
the bank bill was a politically partisan issue, with Federalists
generally supporting it and opponents eventually forming the
48
Jeffersonian or Democratic Republican Party. Constitutional
interpretation on both sides was influenced by these economic,
geographic and partisan interests.
2. Congress’s Inherent Sovereign Power To Provide for the
Nation’s Needs and Exigencies
One of the main constitutional arguments the bank bill’s
proponents asserted in favor of its enactment was the theory
that Congress possessed inherent sovereign powers to meet national needs and exigencies and to accomplish the objects for
which the Constitution was adopted, regardless whether the
requisite sovereign powers were enumerated in Article I or
could be implied from any enumerated power. Like Treasury
Secretary Hamilton, bank supporters argued that a national
bank was necessary to promote the nation’s economy, one of the
purposes for which the Constitution was established, and that
it was indispensable to serve the government’s financial needs
49
in times of crises. For example, Fisher Ames of Massachusetts
explained that the new capital of the bank “will invigorate
trade and manufactures with new energy. It will furnish a medium for the collection of revenues; and if Government should
be pressed by a sudden necessity, it will afford seasonable and
50
effectual aid.” Ames asserted that these considerations made
the establishment of a bank not simply a question of expedien51
cy but of duty.
46. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 117.
47. Id. Charleston, South Carolina, was an important commercial city,
however.
48. See id. at 118–22.
49. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1903 (statement of Rep. Ames); see also infra
notes 130–47 and accompanying text (Hamilton’s arguments).
50. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1903 (statement of Rep. Ames).
51. See id.
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The discussion that follows will show that supporters and
opponents asserted different understandings of the nature of
Congress’s legislative powers and the powers enumerated in
Article I of the Constitution. Bank opponents argued the statesrights-centered, strict construction theory of the Constitution
and insisted that Congress’s legislative powers are fixed and
limited to the enumerated powers. Some conceded that Congress may also exercise unspecified powers, but they limited
these implied powers to those without which Congress could
52
not carry into execution its enumerated powers. The issues for
them, therefore, were the semantic meaning of an enumerated
power and whether the proposed legislative action could be understood to be within the meaning of and essential to the exercise of this power. Opponents’ understanding of enumerated
and implied powers was essentially definitional and abstract
rather than pragmatic. Thus, Representative Michael Stone of
Maryland rejected an argument by Representative Theodore
Sedgwick of Massachusetts that Congress’s power to charter a
bank is implied in the government’s delegated powers to borrow
53
money and to lay and collect taxes. Stone explained that chartering a bank is not the usual means of borrowing money or of
54
collecting taxes.
3. The Doctrine of Congress’s Inherent Sovereign Authority To
Legislate
In contrast to opponents, bank supporters understood
enumerated powers, along with the Constitution’s Preamble
and other provisions, as delegations of ends or objects for which
Congress possesses the powers of any sovereign nation to accomplish. Representative Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts argued in support of Congress’s power to charter a bank based on
55
its inherent sovereign legislative powers. Popular sovereignty
was the predicate for this inherent power theory. Referring to
the Constitution as “the great law of the people, who are themselves the sovereign Legislature,” Gerry quoted the Preamble to
the Constitution, and declared: “These are the objects for which
the Constitution was established, and in administering it we
56
should always keep them in view.” The “common sense” of
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

For example, see id. at 1940–41 (statement of Rep. Stone).
Id. at 1934.
Id. at 1934–35.
Id. at 1946–48 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
Id. at 1947–48.
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these terms, Gerry opined, dictates the measures to achieve
these objects, “for the security of our property, families, and
liberty—of everything dear to us, depends on our ability to de57
fend them.”
Representative John Lawrence of New York argued that
the government’s ends are broader than the objects specified in
the Preamble. They “are contained in the context of the Consti58
tution” generally. Asserting a theory of inherent sovereign
power, he inferred that “every power necessary to secure these
59
[objects] must necessarily follow” from them. Looking back to
the deficiencies and powerlessness of the Continental Congress,
he asserted that it was “to capacitate the Government of the
United States, and [to] form a more perfect union, [that] the
60
Constitution” was adopted. To deny Congress the power to enact legislation to achieve any of its purposes for which the Constitution was adopted “involves the grossest absurdity,” Law61
rence insisted.
Representative Elias Boudinot of New Jersey cited Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 23 and declared that no argument of the same length “could more forcibly and pointedly elucidate and prove the construction contended for in support of
62
the bill on the table.” In this number, Hamilton identified
some of the “principal purposes” for which the U.S. was established, but he focused on national defense to illustrate his theory of the national government’s inherent sovereign powers to
63
accomplish its purposes and to meet national exigencies.
Hamilton declared that “[t]hese powers ought to exist without
64
limitation.” The reason is that the circumstances that may
endanger the nation’s safety are infinite, and “it is impossible to

57. Id. at 1948.
58. Id. at 1914–15 (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
59. Id. at 1915.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1926 (statement of Rep. Boudinot).
63. The national purposes Hamilton listed are: the common defense;
preservation of the peace as well against “internal convulsions as external attacks”; the regulation of commerce with other nations and among the states;
and the “superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with
foreign countries.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
64. Id. Hamilton included the following powers: raising an army; building
and equipping a fleet; prescribing rules for the governance of each; directing
their operation; providing for their support. Id.
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foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies,
and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which
65
may be necessary to satisfy them.” Consequently, “[Congress’s]
power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combina66
tions of such circumstances.” The circumstances that may create a national exigency are unlimited and cannot be anticipat67
Consequently, the national government should be
ed.
entrusted with all of the powers “a free people ought to delegate
to any government,” and that are sufficient “for the manage68
ment of our NATIONAL INTERESTS.”
Based on Hamilton’s Federalist No. 23, Boudinot asserted
conceptions of the Constitution that Chief Justice Marshall
employed in his McCulloch opinion: an enumeration in the
Constitution of every power Congress might exercise would
take on the prolixity of a legal code, and a developmental conception of the Constitution expanding Congress’s legislative
69
powers to meet unforeseen circumstances. Boudinot stated
that “it was universally understood that whenever a general
power was given, especially to a supreme Legislature, every
necessary means to carry it into execution were [sic] necessari70
ly included.” This was the universal understanding of mankind, “without which it would require a multitude of volumes to
contain the original powers of an increasing Government that
must necessarily be changing its relative situation every year
71
or two.” It is important to keep in mind that Boudinot’s theory
of “general power” included inherent sovereign powers to accomplish the objects and ends for which the Constitution was
ratified and the national government established, in particular,
72
to provide for the general welfare.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 156.
69. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1924, 1925–28 (1791) (statement of Rep.
Boudinot).
70. Id. at 1925.
71. Id. For Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in McCulloch, see infra
notes 391–94 and accompanying text.
72. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1925 (1791) (statement of Rep. Boudinot); see
also infra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
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4. Bank Opponents Reject Supporters’ National Sovereignty
Theory
Opponents of the bank bill acknowledged proponents’ inherent national sovereignty theory in support of Congress’s implied power to charter a corporation, and they rejected it. Representative Stone observed that several supporters thought “all
Governments, instituted for certain ends, draw to them the
73
means of execution as of common right.” Reading the Constitution’s Preamble, he declared: “Here is your Constitution!
74
Here is your bill of rights!” He suggested that supporters of
the bank bill needed nothing more “respecting the powers of
75
Congress, than a description of the ends of Government.”
Stone asked rhetorically, “I would ask if there is any power under Heaven which could not be exercised within the extensive
76
limits of this preamble?” Under the bank proponents’ doctrine,
the Constitution’s enumerated powers would become a dead
letter. Under their doctrine of implied powers, Stone objected,
there was no need to specify the powers to accomplish “the ends
77
mentioned in the preamble.” James Madison also rejected the
idea that the Preamble was a source of Congress’s legislative
powers, stating that “the preamble only states the objects of the
Confederation, and the subsequent clauses designate the ex78
press powers by which those objects are to be obtained.”
D. CONFLICTING THEORIES OF INDEPENDENT AND SUBSTANTIVE
SOVEREIGN POWERS
Madison made an elaborate argument against the theory of
independent and substantive powers implied from the sovereign nature of the national government that bank supporters
were arguing Congress may exercise to accomplish the ends or
objects stated in the Preamble. He distinguished between powers “necessary and proper for the Government or Union,” which
he characterized as “expressly enumerated,” and powers that
were “necessary and proper for executing the enumerated powers,” which he asserted “were included in the enumerated pow-

73. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1931 (statement of Rep. Stone).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1931.
77. Id. Representative William Giles of Virginia also made the same
points. See id. at 1937–45 (statement of Rep. Giles).
78. Id. at 1957 (statement of Rep. Madison).
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ers [and] were not expressed, but [were] to be drawn from the
79
nature of each.” This enumeration of substantive sovereign
powers “constituted the peculiar nature of the [U.S.] Government; no [independent and substantive] power, therefore, not
enumerated could be inferred from the general nature of Gov80
ernment.” Madison illustrated this distinction by noting that,
had the framers failed to enumerate the power to make treaties, the national government would not have been able to
make treaties without a constitutional amendment granting
81
this power, however lamentable this failure might have been.
From his theory of sovereign and independent powers and
implied powers, Madison argued that Congress did not have
the power to charter a national bank. The power to charter a
corporation “could never be deemed . . . a means of executing
82
another power,” he insisted. The power of incorporation “was
in its nature a distinct, an independent and substantive prerogative, which not being enumerated in the Constitution,
could never have been meant to be included in it, and not being
83
included, could never be rightfully exercised” by Congress. “By
exercising this power and creating a bank,” Madison argued,
this bill would create “an artificial person, previously not existing in law. It confers important civil rights and attributes,
84
which could not otherwise be claimed.”
Additionally, the corporation thus created would supersede
and infringe the sovereign rights of the states. It was “a power
. . . obnoxious to the States, whose laws would then be superseded, not only by the laws of Congress, but by the by-laws of a
85
corporation within their own jurisdiction.” This power also
substantively affected the rights of the individual. “It involves a
monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen. It
leads to a penal regulation, perhaps capital punishments, one
86
of the most solemn acts of sovereign authority.” From this
perspective, Madison concluded, the power of incorporation

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 1900.
Id.
Id. at 1900–01.
Id. at 1900.
Id.
Id. at 1899–1900.
Id. at 1900.
Id.
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could never be considered an incidental means to carry into ex87
ecution an enumerated power.
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts rebutted Madison’s arguments with a powerful argument of his own based on a similar
hypothetical that demonstrated the need for Congress to exercise an unenumerated substantive, sovereign power to meet a
national exigency. Suppose the Constitution had failed to confer on Congress the power to raise an army when the country is
88
invaded by another nation, Ames hypothesized. Who could
deny that the national government would have the power to
89
raise an army to defend the nation from such an attack? From
the instant a government is formed, Ames argued, “it has tacitly annexed to its being, various powers which the individuals
who framed it did not separately possess, but which are essen90
tial to its effecting the purposes for which it was framed.”
Presaging Marshall’s McCulloch opinion, Ames admonished,
“to declare, in detail, every thing that Government may do
could not be performed, and has never been attempted. It
would be endless, useless, and dangerous; exceptions of what it
91
may not do are shorter and safer.”
Representative Boudinot also rejected Madison’s constitutional construction. He made an argument that anticipated
Chief Justice Marshall’s national sovereignty theory of Congress’s inherent penal powers, which constitutes the Supreme
Court’s effective rejection of Madison’s constitutional construction. Boudinot asserted that congressional penal powers are in92
herent in Congress’s implied power to establish federal courts.
“Examine the law with regard to crimes and punishments under the power of establishing courts, we have implied the power
of punishing the stealing and falsifying the records, and ascer93
tained the punishment of perjury, bribery, and extortion.”

87. See id.
88. See id. at 1903, 1905–07 (statement of Rep. Ames).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1905. For Alexander Hamilton’s version of this theory of inherent sovereign powers, which he referred to as “resulting” powers, see infra
notes 201–10 and accompanying text.
91. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1905 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames). For Chief
Justice Marshall’s statement, see infra notes 391–94 and accompanying text.
Boudinot made the same point. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
92. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1919, 1925–26 (1791) (statement of Rep.
Boudinot).
93. Id. at 1925. Chief Justice Marshall used this example of an inherent
sovereign power in his opinion in McCulloch. See infra notes 401–03 and ac-
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John Vining, also of Delaware, similarly insisted that, as a
free and independent nation, the U.S. possesses all of the sovereign powers possessed by a sovereign nation. He argued that
from “the act by which the United States became a free and independent nation . . . they derive all the powers appertaining to
a nation thus circumstanced, and consequently the power un94
der consideration.” Vining traced the origins of corporations
and concluded that, from the first corporation to the present
day, “all civilized and independent nations have been in the
95
practice of creating them.” Consequently, Congress may also
create them.
Madison replied to Vining and insisted that the theory that
a sovereign government necessarily possesses every sovereign
power does not apply to the United States. “However true this
idea may be in the theory,” Madison opined, he denied “that it
applied to the Government of the United States,” because of
96
“the restrictive clause in the Constitution.” He could not see a
way to avoid the limitations the Tenth Amendment imposed on
97
Congress’s unenumerated powers.
E. DOES THE TENTH AMENDMENT EXPAND OR LIMIT
CONGRESS’S POWERS?
Supporters of the bank bill did not understand the Tenth
Amendment as a preclusion of Congress’s inherent sovereign
98
powers. Like Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch, they interpreted the Tenth Amendment in exactly the opposite way: the
amendment confirmed the doctrine that Congress may exercise
any power necessary to accomplish an end or object for which
the Constitution was established so long as the power is not
expressly prohibited or explicitly reserved to the states or to the
people. Thus, Representative Ames asserted that “Congress
may do whatever is necessary to the end for which the Constitution was adopted, provided it is not repugnant to the natural
rights of man, or to those which they have expressly reserved to

companying text.
94. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1955 (1791) (statement of Rep. Vining).
95. Id. at 1957.
96. Id. (statement of Rep. Madison).
97. See id.
98. For Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion, see infra notes 385–88 and
accompanying text.
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themselves, or to the powers which are assigned to the
99
States.”
Bank supporters objected that restricting Congress’s implied powers to those that are indispensable to carrying into
execution its enumerated powers, as the bank’s opponents argued, would render unconstitutional most of the statutes Congress had enacted over the preceding two years, “for few, if any
of them, could be proved indispensable to the existence of the
100
Government.” Representative Gerry complained that, under
Madison’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, “our whole
101
code of laws is unconstitutional.” “The usage of Congress”
demonstrates that federal legislation was “generally the result
102
of a liberal construction” of the Constitution. Representative
Gerry cited legislation that conferred on the President the exclusive power to remove executive officers and suggested that
Madison was inconsistent in his constitutional construction because he had supported the executive removal statute Congress
103
enacted in 1789. The Constitution is silent on this matter,
Gerry noted, and, according to Madison’s constitutional interpretation, the power to remove executive officers “is vested in
104
the States and the people.” Nevertheless, when the bill that
delegated to the President the power to remove executive officers was before Congress in 1789, Madison had argued that this
unenumerated sovereign power should be vested in the President alone because it is implied from the nature of executive
105
powers to remove executive officials.
F. THE POWER TO REMOVE EXECUTIVE OFFICERS IS INHERENT
IN THE NATURE OF THE EXECUTIVE
During the 1789 legislative debates over who has the power to remove executive officers, Madison made the most elaborate argument that it should rest exclusively in the President
because the removal power is inherent in the nature of execu-

99. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1906 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames). Representative Lawrence made the same point. See id. at 1914–19 (statement of
Rep. Lawrence). For Chief Justice Marshall’s discussion, see infra notes 388–
89, 391–97, and accompanying text.
100. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1911 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
101. Id. at 1951 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
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106

tive powers. Madison declared: “I conceive that if any power
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the
laws. If the Constitution had not qualified the power of the
President in appointing to office, by associating the Senate with
him him [sic] in that business,” Congress would have been
powerless “to unite the Senate with the President in the appointment to office,” and the President would have had the ex107
clusive authority to make these appointments. Since the Constitution is silent with respect to the removal power, which,
Madison asserted, is “as much of an Executive nature as the
other,” Congress does not “have a right to associate [the Senate
108
with the President] in removing persons from office.” The appointment power “only is authorized by being excepted out of
the general rule established by the Constitution, in these
109
words, ‘the Executive power shall be vested in the President.’”
Not only did Madison infer exclusive removal power in the
President from the nature of executive powers in 1789, he also
led a group of representatives who argued that Congress is the
institution that resolves questions of constitutional construction and interpretation when the answers are unclear, and its
interpretation has precedential authority. Thus, Madison insisted that where the Constitution is silent in apportioning
powers, the apportionment “becomes a subject of legislative
discretion,” a constitutional construction consistent with the
McCulloch court’s conclusion that Congress is the institution

106. For recent and conflicting accounts of these debates, compare Curtis
A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 656–64 (2004), with Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J.
231, 300–02 (2001). For additional analyses of these debates, see 1 CORWIN ON
THE CONSTITUTION 317–71 (Richard Loss ed., 1981); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 36–41
(1997); JAMES HART, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN ACTION 1789, at 155–89
(1948); CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 17751796, at 140–65 (1922).
107. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 463 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of
Rep. Madison). For other representatives making the same argument, see id.
at 460 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick); id. at 469–70, 583 (statement of Rep.
Boudinot); id. at 474 (statement of Rep. Ames); id. at 483 (statement of Rep.
Lawrence); id. at 489 (statement of Rep. Clymer); id. at 511–12 (statement of
Rep. Vining); id. at 561 (statement of Rep. Sylvester).
108. Id. at 463 (statement of Rep. Madison).
109. Id.
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that is to adapt the Constitution to changing circumstances.
Madison stated,
If the construction of the Constitution . . . relates to a doubtful part of
the Constitution, I suppose an exposition of the Constitution may
come with as much propriety from the Legislature, as any other department of the Government. If the power naturally belongs to the
Government, and the Constitution is undecided as to the body which
is to exercise it, it is likely that it is submitted to the discretion of the
111
Legislature, and the question will depend upon its own merits.

Madison later commented that the House’s resolution of
this issue “demand[ed] a careful investigation and full discussion,” because its constitutional construction would become a
112
part of the Constitution. Madison stated, “our decision will
involve the decision of all similar cases. The decision that is at
this time made, will become the permanent exposition of the
Constitution; and on a permanent exposition of the Constitution will depend the genius and character of the whole Gov113
ernment.” Madison thus assumed that Congress’s interpreta114
tion of the Constitution carried the authority of precedent.
G. FIRST BANK OPPONENTS REJECT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ASSERT STRICT CONSTRUCTION
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Given the positions they asserted in the executive removal
debates of 1789, Gerry’s conclusion that bank opponents were
inconsistent in their constitutional constructions in the 1791
bank debates was a reasonable critique of the opposition’s arguments generally. Bank opponents rejected bank proponents’
theory of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers and insisted

110. Id. at 462. For other representatives making the same argument, see
id. at 475 (statement of Rep. Ames); id. at 481 (statement of Rep. Hartley); id.
at 484–85 (statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 584–85 (statement of Rep.
Tucker). For the Supreme Court’s conclusion, see infra notes 385–99, 405–12,
425–31, 448–52, 473–74, and accompanying text.
111. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 461 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of
Rep. Madison) (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 495.
113. Id. During these congressional debates, Madison confided to Samuel
Johnston that “the exposition of the Constitution is frequently a Copious
Source [of difficulty], and must continue so untill [sic] its meaning on all great
points shall have been settled by precedents.” Letter from James Madison to
Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 409
n.1 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904).
114. For a discussion of precedent as constitutional authority for legislation, see infra notes 145–60 and accompanying text.
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that the Constitution limited Congress to the powers enumerated in Article I.
For example, Representative Stone objected that the national sovereignty theory is “hostile to the main principle of our
Government,” arguing that if members of Congress “are allowed to range in their sober discretion for the means [to ac115
complish its ends], it is plain they have no limits.” He reminded the House that “[i]t has been shown that the ends of
116
[our] Government will include every thing.” The bank proponents’ doctrine “turn[s the Constitution] upside down, and instead of being a grant of particular powers, guarded by an im117
plied negative to all others, it is made to imply all powers.”
Stone claimed that the framers “forgot to guard it by express
118
negative provisions,” a claim that is contradicted on the face
119
of the Constitution. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall had used
the express prohibitions of Congress’s powers to argue in
McCulloch that the Constitution thereby delegated to Congress
unenumerated sovereign powers that are not explicitly prohibited; otherwise, why include explicit prohibitions on substan120
tive powers not expressly granted.
H. CONGRESS IS AUTHORIZED TO DETERMINE ITS SOVEREIGN
POWERS
An important part of bank proponents’ constitutional arguments supporting Congress’s inherent sovereign powers was
their insistence that Congress is empowered to interpret the
nature and scope of its constitutional powers. This is a constitutional construction Madison embraced in 1789 and abandoned in 1791. National sovereignty advocates based this doctrine on the nature of a written Constitution as necessarily
incomplete and indefinite in the number and scope of Congress’s legislative powers, on the constitutional duty imposed
on Congress to achieve national objectives and to meet national
exigencies, and on the discretionary nature of Congress’s legislative powers in fulfilling its constitutional duties. They main115. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983 (1791) (statement of Rep. Stone).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1983–84.
118. Id. at 1984.
119. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (listing many prohibitions on Congress’s
legislative powers).
120. For the prohibitions, see id. For Chief Justice Marshall’s statement,
see infra notes 393–94 and accompanying text.
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tained that doubtful questions of constitutionality and of constitutional interpretation must therefore be left to the discretion of Congress.
Thus, Fisher Ames asserted that “it is rather late in the
day to adopt it as a principle of conduct” that Congress may not
determine and exercise implied powers, because two years of
121
work would be lost. Ames observed that, for the better part of
two years, “we have scarcely made a law in which we have not
exercised our discretion with regard to the true intent of the
122
Constitution.” He noted that the First Congress had “adopted
it as a safe rule of action to legislate beyond the letter of the
123
Constitution.” The reason, he explained, is that “the ingenuity of man was unequal to providing, especially beforehand, for
124
all the contingencies that would happen.” Ames insisted that
Congress must exercise its judgment as to the meaning of the
125
Constitution.
Representative Boudinot made a similar argument based
on Congress’s legislative function and responsibilities, asserting that the means of achieving the general purposes and ends
of the government, such as providing for the general defense
and the general welfare of the nation, must be left to Congress,
as “it was their duty to fix on the best mode of effecting the
purposes of their appointment . . . provided they do not adopt
126
means expressly forbidden.” Consequently, whether a bank is
“a mere conveniency for the purpose of fiscal transactions, but
not necessary to attain the ends proposed in the Constitution
. . . at best is mere matter of opinion, and must [therefore] be
127
left to the discretion of the Legislature to determine.”
Representative William Smith of South Carolina invoked
James Madison’s earlier views in support of Congress’s power
128
to construe the Constitution. Smith cited to Madison’s statements in the 1789 congressional debates over the President’s
129
power to remove executive officials. In this debate Madison
declared that the Congress had “as good a right as any branch
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954 (1791) (statement of Rep. Ames).
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also id. at 1960 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
Id. at 1954 (statement of Rep. Ames).
Id. at 1973 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1977; see also id. at 1990 (statement of Rep. Giles).
Id. at 1980 (statement of Rep. Smith of S.C.).
Id.
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of the Government to declare our sense of the meaning of the
Constitution. Nothing has yet been offered to invalidate the
doctrine, that the meaning of the Constitution may as well be
130
ascertained by the legislative as by the judicial authority.”
Smith insisted that Madison’s view of Congress’s discretionary
authority to interpret its constitutional powers applied to the
131
bank bill.
Bank supporters also based Congress’s authority to interpret its constitutional powers on a republican theory of popular
132
sovereignty, which recognized “the people themselves” as the
ultimate authority in deciding questions of constitutional interpretation. Congress legislates to achieve its great objects at
its peril, Representative Gerry argued, for the members of both
Houses of Congress “are responsible to their constituents for
133
their conduct in construing the Constitution.”
However, four members of Congress commented that the
judiciary possessed the power to set aside an unconstitutional
act of Congress. Only one bank opponent made this claim, Rep134
resentative William Giles of Virginia. Three of the bill’s supporters conceded the power of the courts to check Congress
135
should it unconstitutionally usurp legislative power.
It is not clear that these legislators were expressing a theory of judicial review as we understand it today, as a judicial
power to void a statute and extinguish it as a law as distinguished from declaring a statute null and void and consequently refuse to enforce it. Representative Boudinot clearly expressed this latter understanding. He responded to legislators
who opposed the bank bill because it might be adjudged by the
judiciary as “contrary to the Constitution, and therefore void;
136
and not lend their aid to carry it into execution.” In any case,
Boudinot retorted that this claim strengthened his resolve to
130. Id. at 546–47 (1789) (statement of Rep. Madison). For a fuller discussion of Madison’s theory of congressional supremacy in interpreting the Constitution, see supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
131. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1980, 1988 (1791) (statement of Rep. Smith of
S.C.).
132. The idea of “the people themselves” as the ultimate authority on questions of constitutionality is taken from LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
133. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2003 (1791) (statement of Rep. Gerry).
134. Id. at 1996 (statement of Rep. Giles).
135. Id. at 1966 (statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 1988 (statement of
Rep. Smith of S.C.); id. at 1978 (statement of Rep. Boudinot).
136. Id. at 1978 (statement of Rep. Boudinot) (emphasis added).
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vote for the bill and “all subjects of a constitutional nature,” because, “he reflected that if . . . he should do wrong, that there
was a power in the Government which could constitutionally
prevent the operation of such a wrong measure from effecting
137
his constituents.” Boudinot gloated that “it was the glory of
the Constitution that there was a remedy even for the failures
138
of the supreme Legislature itself.”
Reflecting his departmentalist view of constitutional interpretation, Madison rejected the claim of those who maintained
139
that the judiciary “will rectify our mistakes.” He did not see
how a judge might decide such a question other than “by rules
140
of expediency.” The position Madison asserted on this issue in
the House debates was consistent with the view he expressed in
his Federalist No. 44, where he identified political process as
141
the ultimate check on Congress’s usurpation of power. There
he observed that the success of a congressional usurpation of
power depended upon the executive and judicial departments,
142
“which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts.”
However, “in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from
the people, who can, by the election of more faithful representa143
tives, annul the acts of the usurpers.” Although Madison’s
views on this point were consistent, on other important points
Madison moved 180 degrees away from the principles he affirmed in Federalist No. 44. Moreover, he took the opposite
view and supported Congress’s power to charter the national
144
bank as President in 1816.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENT AS AUTHORITY FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
It was a logical progression to reason from Congress’s authority to define its constitutional powers to the doctrine that
Congress’s prior actions may serve as precedent for its subse-

137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 1979.
139. Id. at 2010 (statement of Rep. Madison).
140. Id.
141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 285–86 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
142. Id. at 286.
143. Id. This is one of the main claims of KRAMER, supra note 132, at 8.
144. See infra notes 225–29 and accompanying text (describing this support).
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145

Opposition leader Representative Giles
quent actions.
acknowledged that the bank’s proponents argued that a source
of Congress’s implied power to charter a bank was the “former
146
usages and habits of Congress.” He distinguished the examples supporters referred to and declared that unconstitutional
acts of the past should be stopped and not be used to support
147
unconstitutional acts in the present.
The doctrine of constitutional precedent was an important
theory of determining governmental power and individual
148
rights in eighteenth century Anglo-American law. Many of
the colonists’ legal/constitutional arguments for and against the
acts of Parliament and colonial rights that led to the American
149
Revolution were based on historical precedent. William E.
Nelson relates other aspects of colonial constitutional norms
and practices that political leaders carried into the new nation
in the forthcoming volume four of The Common Law of Colonial
150
America.
Arguments from precedent were made for and against
Congress’s power to charter the First Bank. The bill’s supporters based their argument that Congress had legislative authority to enact the bank bill in part on the precedent of the Bank of
North America enacted by the Continental Congress in 1781.
Representative Lawrence asserted that the Bank of North

145. See 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1975–76 (1791) (statement of Rep. Boudinot);
id. at 1981 (statement of Rep. Smith of S.C.); id. at 2008 (statement of Rep.
Vining) (supporting the authority of Congress to define its constitutional powers); supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
146. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1995 (1791) (statement of Rep. Giles).
147. Id.
148. For the most thorough examination of the doctrine and authority of
precedents and how they were used in the pre-Revolutionary struggle between
the American colonies and Parliament, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986–1993). For an abridged
edition of these four volumes, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (abridged ed. 1995). The importance of
precedent, especially legislative precedent as constitutional authority for subsequent legislation and public policy, is explained in JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO
LEGISLATE, 166–71, 198–200, 211–21, 246–72 (1991).
149. E.g., JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO TAX 122–34 (1987) (describing
the use of the theory of precedent in arguing for and against Parliamentary
taxes).
150. William E. Nelson, The Common Law of Colonial America, Volume
Four: On the Eve of Revolution, 1735-1776, at 370–88 (Oct. 17, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

728

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:699

America was precedential authority from an inherent national
151
sovereignty theory. Lawrence argued that “the old Congress
exercised the power, as they thought, by a fair construction of
152
the Confederation.” He insisted that no one would disagree
that the present government was vested with powers equal to
153
the late Confederation.
Interestingly, Madison conceded bank proponents’ argument that precedent established Congress’s authority to charter the First Bank, but he insisted that the Bank of North
America was distinguishable and therefore not precedential au154
thority for the First Bank bill. Madison maintained that
“[t]his [Bank of North America] was known . . . to have been
the child of necessity. It never could be justified by the regular
155
powers of the articles of Confederation.” He explained that
the national government’s financial needs in 1791 could be
156
supplied by state banks, which did not exist in 1781. His position appears to endorse bank proponents’ constitutional doctrine of inherent sovereign powers to meet national exigencies.
Representative Boudinot countered that state banks, private investors, and foreign sources of credit were insufficient to
meet the nation’s government constitutional obligations in 1791
and also argued the national sovereignty theory in support of
157
the First Bank bill. The Constitution delegates to Congress
the duty to provide for the general defense, especially during
158
war, and the general welfare of the nation. Consequently,
Congress must possess the power “to secure institutions at
home from which loans may be obtained at all times at moderate terms and in such amounts as the necessity of the State
151. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1965 (1791) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1941. For other proponents who cited the Bank of North America as a precedential authority, see id. at 1975 (statement of Rep. Boudinot); id.
at 2005 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
154. Madison had asserted the principle of congressional precedent as an
authoritative constitutional construction in the debates relating to the executive removal power. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
155. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
156. Id. The same argument is made in id. at 2011 (asking whether “precedents in war [are] to justify violations of private and State rights in a time of
peace”); id. at 1984 (statement of Rep. Stone); id. at 1995 (statement of Rep.
Giles) (denying that the Bank of North America was a precedent for the First
Bank because the necessity for the bank in 1781 did not exist in 1791).
157. Id. at 1973–75 (statement of Rep. Boudinot).
158. See id. at 174 (describing reliance on foreign loans as contrary to this
provision).
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159

might require.” Boudinot asserted that a national bank is a
“necessary means, without which the end could not be ob160
tained.”
J. POWERS IMPLIED FROM ENUMERATED POWERS
In addition to the broad theories of Congress’s inherent
sovereign legislative powers, the bank bill’s proponents also
broadly construed Congress’s powers implied from those enumerated in Article I. They argued that Congress’s power to
charter a national bank is implied in several of the enumerated
powers, such as the power to levy and collect taxes, to borrow
money, to pay the debts of the U.S., to regulate commerce, and
161
to provide for the general defense and welfare of the U.S.
Interpretations of powers implied from enumerated powers
were made in connection with interpretations of the Necessary
162
and Proper Clause. These interpretations, both broad and
narrow, are well known. Opponents of the bank bill insisted
that Congress may exercise only those implied powers that are
indispensably necessary to carry into execution the enumerated
163
powers to which they are incidents. Thus, Representative
Giles interpreted “necessary” in the same way Maryland’s
164
counsel interpreted it in McCulloch v. Maryland, as a power
165
without which “the end could not be produced.” Madison more
broadly defined the Necessary and Proper Clause “according to
the natural and obvious force of the terms and the context” as
“limited to means necessary to the end, and incident to the na166
ture of the specified powers.”
It is important to note that Madison acknowledged that
Congress possesses implied powers even without the Necessary
167
and Proper Clause. He asserted that “[t]he [Necessary and
Proper] [C]lause is merely declaratory of what would have re-

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text (describing how this
power was argued to be implied).
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
163. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1967 (1791) (statement of Rep. Jackson); id. at
1985–87 (statement of Rep. Stone); id. at 1990–95 (statement of Rep. Giles).
164. See infra notes 426, 433, 458–63, and accompanying text, especially
notes 462–63, for further analysis of this case.
165. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1993 (1791) (statement of Rep. Giles).
166. Id. at 1947 (statement of Rep. Madison).
167. Id.
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sulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and, as
168
it were, the technical means of executing those powers.” Mad169
ison appears to have been paraphrasing his Federalist No. 44.
Madison thus asserted a broader theory of implied powers than
congressional supporters of strict construction constitutionalism, but narrower than congressional advocates of national
sovereignty constitutionalism. Nevertheless, Madison and the
other opponents of the bank bill insisted that the power to
charter a bank was not incidental to any of Congress’s enumer170
ated powers.
K. CONGRESS’S INHERENT POWERS TO PROVIDE FOR THE
NATION’S GENERAL WELFARE
Even though some bank proponents claimed that Congress
could charter the proposed bank as a power implied from enumerated powers, they continued to employ an inherent sovereign powers theory based on the power to provide for the general welfare and other ends stated in the Preamble, Article I,
171
and throughout the Constitution. Congress may therefore exercise any power that is necessary to achieve the purposes and
ends for which it was established. Consequently, its powers
“are so numerous,” and “capable of such infinite variation, as to
render an enumeration impracticable, and must therefore be
172
left to construction and necessary implication.” Thus, many
supporters of the bank bill confirmed Madison’s view that supporters’ interpretation of Congress’s legislative powers, in pursuing the general welfare, “will reach every object of legislation,
173
every object within the whole compass of political economy.”
Representative Gerry applied William Blackstone’s last
rule of interpretation of legal texts in support of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers: “when the words are dubious,” to ascertain “the true meaning of a law,” one should look to “the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the
174
Essentially paraphrasing the Constitution’s
Legislature.”
168. Id.
169. Madison, supra note 141, at 285.
170. See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1950 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison)
(stating that the bank would be only convenient, not necessary).
171. See infra notes 172–76 and accompanying text (outlining this theory).
172. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1962 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick); see also
supra, notes 61–65 and accompanying text (describing this theory).
173. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
174. Id. at 2002 (statement of Rep. Gerry).
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Preamble, Gerry broadly defined the causes that moved the
people to adopt the Constitution: “[A]n imperfect Union, want
of public and private justice, internal commotions, a defenceless
[sic] community, neglect of the public welfare, and danger to
175
our liberties.” If these causes produced the Constitution, they
not only empower Congress to remove them, but they also require Congress to make all laws that are necessary and proper
176
for carrying these ends into effect.
The House debates leading to the creation of the First
Bank demonstrate that the primary constitutional theory supporters of the bank bill asserted was inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism that encompassed a doctrine of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers that were limited to
accomplishing the ends and objects stated in the Preamble and
the other clauses in the Constitution. In anachronistic twentyfirst-century terms, supporters were asserting a kind of federal
police power defined by and limited to the ends and objects established in the Constitution.
177
Opponents essentially acknowledged this theory. James
Madison noted that the bank’s supporters failed to distinguish
between powers “inferred from the general nature of Government” and powers that are “necessary and proper for executing
178
He complained that supporters
the enumerated powers.”
maintained that Congress may exercise sovereign powers that
are not enumerated, ignoring the “peculiar nature of the [national] Government” in which “the powers composing the Gov179
Consequently, alternment were expressly enumerated.”
hough the supporters’ theory of general powers applied to other
nation-states, Madison reasoned, it did not apply to the U.S.
government, and sovereign powers of government that are not
enumerated in the Constitution “could not be inferred from the
180
general nature of [the national] Government.” Madison’s argument here is 180 degrees opposite to his analysis of Con-

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text for Madison’s views on
the issue.
178. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1950 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1900; see also id. at 1957 (arguing that the Constitution limits
the powers of government to those expressly written).
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gress’s legislative powers in Federalist No. 44 and as Presi181
dent.
It was with good reason that the bank’s opponents warned
that, if it were conceded that Congress may charter the proposed bank, it could charter manufacturing companies, canal
companies, and even religious societies and employ religious
teachers in every parish and pay them from the U.S. Treas182
ury. If supporters’ national sovereignty and inherent congressional powers constitutionalism were adopted, Congress would
soon possess “all possible powers” of government, reducing the
183
Constitution to “nothing but a name.”
The House nevertheless passed the bank bill on February
184
8, 1791, by a vote of thirty-nine yea to twenty nay. Bray
Hammond has reported that thirty-three out of the thirty-nine
votes in favor of the bill came from representatives from New
185
England, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Most of
the votes against the bill, fifteen of twenty, were cast by repre186
sentatives from Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. The
vote confirms the views of historians and members of the First
Congress who claimed that legislators’ views regarding the constitutionality of the First Bank were affected, and possibly determined, by their economic, financial, and geographical inter187
ests.
The bill was sent to President George Washington for his
188
signature. However, the President referred the bill to his attorney general, Edmund Randolph, his secretary of state,
Thomas Jefferson, and his secretary of the treasury, Alexander
Hamilton, for their views regarding the bill’s constitutionali189
ty. Jefferson’s and Hamilton’s reports on the bill’s constitutionality have achieved canonical status on the theories of implied powers.

181. See supra notes 110–14 and accompanying text; infra notes 451–53,
477–80, and accompanying text (discussing Madison’s opposing position that
the powers of government are not limited to those expressly enumerated).
182. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1897 (1791) (statement of Rep. Madison).
183. Id. at 1917 (statement of Rep. Jackson).
184. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 116–17.
185. Id. at 117.
186. Id.
187. See supra notes 34–47 and accompanying text.
188. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 117.
189. Id.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE IN PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON’S CABINET
A. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S
OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BANK
Secretary of State Jefferson and Attorney General Randolph echoed the strict construction constitutionalism asserted
by congressional opponents of the First Bank. It is well known,
190
and I have already explained the theory. Alexander Hamilton’s opinion has not been fully understood and requires some
elaboration.
Hamilton wrote his report after he had examined those of
Jefferson and Randolph. Hamilton’s report was far more comprehensive and detailed than the other two combined. His
analysis embraced the national sovereignty constitutionalism
argued by the House bank proponents, and it followed a structure of analysis and asserted constitutional constructions that
Chief Justice Marshall later adopted in his McCulloch opin191
ion. That is, Hamilton first presented arguments and interpretations based on general reasoning and general principles of
192
government. He then offered his interpretation of enumerat193
ed and implied powers.
Hamilton’s opinion was a rebuttal to Jefferson’s and Randolph’s arguments against the constitutionality of the bank bill
because the power of incorporation is a sovereign power that
194
the Constitution does not explicitly delegate to Congress.
Hamilton’s reply was based on his understanding that the national government possesses the sovereign powers inherent in
195
all sovereign governments. He articulated national sovereignty constitutionalism when he proclaimed:
[T]his general principle is inherent in the very definition of Government and essential to every step of the progress . . . of the United
States; namely—that every power vested in a Government is in its

190. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining strict construction constitutionalism).
191. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 117–18; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
192. Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Feb. 1791–July 1791, 97, 98 (Harold Syrett ed., 1965).
193. Id. at 100.
194. Id. at 112.
195. Id. at 98.
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nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ
all the means requisite, and fairly applicable to the attainment of the
196
ends of such power . . . .

There are only two limitations on the national government’s exercise of these inherent powers, Hamilton argued: the
first limitation consists of any restriction or prohibition that is
explicitly stated in the Constitution or would violate a principle
of morality or good government; the second limitation is that
the United States exercise its powers to achieve an end or ends
197
that the Constitution vests in it.
Satisfied that general political theories establish that governments, including the U.S. government, possess inherent
sovereign powers, Hamilton concluded that “[t]his general &
indisputable principle puts at once an end to the abstract question—Whether the United States have power to erect a corpora198
tion . . . .” He explained that “it is unquestionably incident to
sovereign power to erect corporations, and consequently to that
of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to the
199
management of the government.” Hamilton thus recognized a
distinction between a government whose authority “is general,”
which can therefore “create corporations in all cases” and a
government, such as the U.S. government, whose authority is
200
confined to certain objects and ends. The U.S. government
may exercise the sovereign powers that inhere in governments
generally, but “only in those cases” related to its objects and
201
ends.
Hamilton identified three classes of national governmental
powers. It is undeniable, he asserted, “that there are implied,
as well as express powers, and that the former are as effectually
202
delegated as the latter.” However, there is a third class of
powers, Hamilton opined, which he labeled “resulting pow203
ers.” These are powers that “result from the whole mass of
the powers of the government & from the nature of political so196. Id.
197. Id. at 99–100.
198. Id. at 99.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 100.
203. Id. Representatives Madison, Ames, Boudinot and Vining debated
whether the national government may exercise substantive sovereign powers
that are not expressly delegated. See supra notes 79–97 and accompanying
text.
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ciety, than a consequence of either of the powers specially enu204
merated.”
Hamilton illustrated resulting powers with the example of
the United States asserting dominion over territory it might
have conquered from another country. The national government “would possess sovereign jurisdiction over the conquered
territory” even though this sovereign power is neither express
205
nor implied. Hamilton asserted that this example “furnishes
206
a striking illustration of the general doctrine contended for.”
Congress’s “power of erecting corporations is either implied in,
or would result from some or all of the powers, vested in the
207
National Government.” “The only question,” then, is “whether
the mean to be employed,” that is, whether the unenumerated
power, “has a natural relation to any of the acknowledged ob208
jects or lawful ends of the government.” For Hamilton, this
was an empirical question of fact and not a semantic question
of textual meaning as strict constructionists argued. Hamilton
illustrated this point by noting that Congress did not have the
power to charter a corporation “for superintending the police of
the city of Philadelphia,” the city in which Congress met in
1791, “because they are not authorised to regulate the police of
209
that city.” But Congress may charter a corporation to achieve
national ends “because it is the province of the federal [sic] government to regulate those objects & because it is incident to a
general sovereign or legislative power to regulate a thing, to
employ all the means which relate to its regulation to the best
210
& greatest advantage.”
Hamilton asserted another maxim of government, the
“sound maxim of construction namely, that the powers contained in a constitution of government . . . ought to be con211
strued liberally, in advancement of the public good.” Hamilton explained that “[t]he means by which national exigencies
are to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, na-

204. Id. Justice Joseph Story also affirmed the doctrine of resulting powers
in his treatise on the Constitution. See infra notes 512, 514–16, and accompanying text.
205. Hamilton, supra note 192, at 100.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 100–01.
211. Id. at 105.
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tional prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent
and complexity, that there must, of necessity, be great latitude
of discretion in the selection & application of those means . . .
212
[based] on principles of liberal construction.”
The only restriction limiting Congress’s powers, such as its
powers to tax and spend for the general welfare, “which does
not apply to other governments,” is that Congress “cannot
rightfully apply the money they raise to any purpose merely or
213
With this exception, Hamilton maintained,
purely local.”
Congress has “as large a discretion in relation to the application of money as any legislature whatever. The constitutional
test of a right application must always be whether it be for a
purpose of general or local nature. If the former, there can be
214
no want of constitutional power.” Furthermore, the extent to
which Congress’s action really promotes the nation’s welfare
215
“must be a matter of [Congress’s] conscientious discretion.”
Arguments relating to Congress’s discretion whether to use its
legislative power to promote the general welfare “must be arguments concerning expediency or inexpediency, not constitu216
tional right.”
B. THE FIRST BANK AND BANKING, 1791–1811
Secretary Hamilton’s arguments persuaded President
Washington that the bank bill was constitutional. The President signed the bank bill into law on February 25, 1791, two
217
days after he received Hamilton’s report. The government of
the U.S. acquired $2 million of the initial $10 million stock is218
sue. Other investors included one-third of the members of
Congress and at least one-half of the members who had voted
219
for the bank bill. Merchants, professional men, speculators,
other politicians, the Boston-based Massachusetts Bank, Harvard College, and the state of New York also invested in shares
220
of First Bank stock. Located in Philadelphia, the First Bank

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id.
HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 118.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id.

2016]

INHERENT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

737
221

opened branches in eight other cities from 1792 to 1805.
Three of these branches were opened during Thomas Jeffer222
son’s presidency with his approval, albeit unhappily.
Apart from constitutional scruples, the First Bank’s incorporation was a defining issue in the development of political
parties. The First Bank was a Federalist Party institution op223
posed by southern anti-Federalists. The bank, along with
other Federalist Party policies led to the creation of the first
party of opposition, the Jeffersonian or Democratic Republican
Party. The bank was run by Federalists, who were perceived to
have operated it as an instrument of partisan politics and pat224
ronage. This perception, the fact that a majority of its stock
was owned by British and European investors, and “the extreme jealousy of the State banks” made it “an object of general
225
These political, economic, and financial interests
odium.”
played important roles in legislators’ determinations whether
the First Bank was constitutional and whether Congress
should extend the First Bank’s charter in 1811.
III. CONGRESS DEBATES RECHARTER OF THE FIRST
BANK IN 1811
A. ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND OF
THE SECOND BANK
The First Bank’s charter was due to expire in 1811. At the
behest of the Senate, President Madison’s treasury secretary,
Albert Gallatin, issued a report to Congress on March 9, 1809,
urging Congress to renew the bank’s charter for another twenty
226
years. Congress did not take up the measure until January
1810, but it did not give it concentrated attention until January
227
1811. After vigorous debate, the House decided by one vote
(sixty-five to sixty-four) on January 24, 1811, to postpone the

221. Id. at 127. Branches were opened in Boston, New York, Baltimore,
Charleston, Norfolk, Washington, Savannah, and New Orleans.
222. Id. These branches were Washington, D.C., and Savannah, Georgia, in
1802 and New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1805.
223. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 504 (1926).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 209.
227. Id. at 209–10.
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228

bill indefinitely. This effectively defeated the extension of the
First Bank’s charter in the House. The Senate then took up a
229
bill on February 5, 1811. This measure was also defeated by
230
one vote, eighteen to seventeen, on February 20. The Senate’s
deciding vote was cast by Vice President George Clinton when
231
the floor vote tied at seventeen. The First Bank’s charter consequently expired in 1811.
One of the findings of this study is that economic, political,
geographic, and occupational interests as much as, if not more
than, commitment to constitutional values and principles determined the constitutional positions of political actors. The
First Bank was a partisan institution at its creation and over
its entire life. The political divisions in Congress for and
232
against the First Bank in 1811 differed from those in 1791.
The original bank bill was mostly supported by northern Federalists and business interests, and the bank served their banking needs and economic interests as did the national government through its promotion and protection of trade and
233
economic development. Southerners were mostly agrarians
and opposed the bank and the national government’s economic
234
policies.
The political alignments of 1791 had changed by 1811.
Bank supporters and opponents cut across party and geographical lines by the time its charter came up for renewal in 1811.
James Madison, who had led the opposition in the House and
argued against the bank’s constitutionality in 1791, as Presi235
dent in 1811 supported renewing the First Bank’s charter.
Many of the administration’s Democratic Republican congressional allies from the North, the South, and the West also fa236
vored the charter’s renewal, though others opposed it. The
bill’s floor leaders in the Senate and the House were both Dem237
Federalists from the North and the
ocratic Republicans.
238
South also split.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 210–11, 219.
Id. at 210.
Id. at 210–11.
Id. at 210. The floor leaders were Senator William Crawford of Geor-
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Over the course of the First Bank’s life, the states became
involved in promoting economic expansion and diversification,
and they increased the number of state-chartered banks from
239
three to more than seventy. State banks served many of the
local financial needs of merchants and state governments for
short-term credit as well as the long-term credit needs of me240
chanics, manufacturers, and farmers. According to financial
historian Bray Hammond, many businesses increasingly favored the state governments and state banks, and many agrarians turned increasingly to the national government and the
241
First Bank. Moreover, Democratic Republicans were no longer overwhelmingly agrarian and yeoman farmers. They included commercial farmers, artisans, mechanics, and entrepre242
neurs. Consequently, attitudes toward the First Bank, the
national and state governments, the emerging state banks, and
public policy became more complicated and mixed among economic groups, sections of the country, and the political parties.
Hammond expressed skepticism regarding the sincerity of
some of the opposing leaders’ concern over the bank’s constitutionality, naming Senator Samuel Smith of Baltimore, Maryland, Senator Henry Clay of Lexington, Kentucky, and Repre243
This
sentative Peter B. Porter of Buffalo, New York.
skepticism would apply equally to bank supporters. Legislators
who debated the question of the First Bank’s recharter support
Hammond’s skepticism because they asserted that constitutional arguments were inspired by the economic and partisan
244
interests of their constituents. These views suggest that, although many political leaders may have held and asserted theories of constitutional interpretation out of a commitment to
constitutional principles independent of other interests, for
many who argued the First Bank recharter question, constitutional interpretation was as much or more a matter of political
argument to advance economic, political, and other interests as
it was sincerely held belief.

gia and Representative William Findley of Pennsylvania.
238. Id. at 210–11.
239. WOOD, supra note 6, at 296.
240. Id.
241. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 219.
242. Id. at 219–20; WOOD, supra note 6, at 296.
243. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 214.
244. See, e.g., 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 663–64 (1814) (statement of Rep. Hanson); id. at 665 (statement of Rep. Grosvenor).
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B. THEORY OF CONGRESS’S INHERENT SOVEREIGN POWERS
Members of Congress reasserted many of the arguments
regarding the First Bank’s constitutionality that had been advanced by its proponents and opponents in 1791. For example,
First Bank supporters again insisted that Congress’s legislative
powers are sovereign powers and that Congress possesses the
inherent sovereign power to charter a corporation to accomplish
the objects, ends, and purposes for which the Constitution was
245
adopted. They agreed that the power to charter a corporation
246
“is an act of sovereignty.” Moreover, “[t]he right to create a
corporation is a right inherent in every sovereignty,” and, since
everyone agreed that banks are necessary to handle the financial affairs of the nation, “it appears to be established that the
247
Federal Government does possess this right.” Bank supporters admonished bank opponents that “[o]ur power to perform
these acts results from the nature of the national sovereignty
248
created by this Constitution.” They paraphrased Alexander
Hamilton’s constitutional construction and insisted that
every power vested in a Government is in its nature sovereign, and
includes by force of the term a right to employ all the means requisite,
and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power, and
which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the
Constitution, or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of
249
political society.

Supporters of the bank charter renewal also interpreted
Congress’s enumerated powers as statements of the objects,
purposes, and ends for which Congress possesses inherent powers of a sovereign legislature to accomplish. Thus, if “the Government is sovereign as to any object,” Representative Stanley
explained, “the power to incorporate companies, as the fit and
necessary means for the attainment of that object, must regu-

245. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 659 (1811) (statement of Rep. Key); id. at 755
(statement of Rep. Garland); id. at 308 (statement of Sen. Pickering); id. at
219 (statement of Sen. Pope).
246. Id. at 798 (statement of Rep. Stanley); id. at 272–73, 280 (statement of
Sen. Brent); id. at 297 (statement of Sen. Taylor). But see id. at 211–12
(statement of Sen. Clay).
247. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 144 (1811) (statement of Sen. Crawford); see also
id. at 141. Chief Justice Marshall asserted this position in his McCulloch opinion. See infra notes 395–98 and accompanying text.
248. Id. at 231 (statement of Sen. Pope); see also id. at 273, 276 (statement
of Sen. Brent).
249. Id. at 663 (statement of Rep. Pickman, Jr.); see also id. at 137 (statement of Sen. Crawford).
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larly result from and be appurtenant to this sovereignty.”
Like their congressional predecessors in 1791, congressional
bank proponents in 1811 argued that the objects and ends of
the national government are stated in the Constitution’s Pre251
amble as well as in the delegated powers of Article I.
Moreover, Representative Stanley declared that Congress’s
sovereign “power is not left to inference,” because the Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause and the Supremacy Clause
252
establish Congress’s sovereignty. Thus, bank supporters defined an enumerated power as “an authority to attain a given
253
end.” Specifically how Congress may achieve the given end is
within Congress’s discretion since there are many means by
which a power may be executed and the end achieved, and the
choice of these means is explicitly vested in Congress by the
254
Necessary and Proper Clause. More broadly, Representative
Key maintained that “[w]e need not look to the Constitution
always for precise terms to justify an exercise of power, because
255
it is but an enumeration of first principles,” arguably a version of Hamilton’s theory of resulting powers. According to this
view, the erection of a bank is not a constitutional question but
256
merely a question of discretion to achieve a public good. U.S.
Senators made similar arguments when the Senate debated the
257
bank’s recharter.
As they did in 1791, First Bank opponents acknowledged
that bank supporters asserted an inherent sovereignty theory
of congressional legislative power, and they rejected it and argued the strict construction theory of limited congressional
258
powers. Notably, Senator Smith of Maryland alarmingly de250. Id. at 798 (statement of Rep. Stanley); see also id. at 715 (statement of
Rep. Gold); id. at 762, 769 (statement of Rep. Nicholson); id. at 781 (statement
of Rep. Tallmadge).
251. Id. at 762–63 (statement of Rep. Nicholson).
252. Id. at 798 (statement of Rep. Stanley); see also id. at 799.
253. See, e.g., id. at 661 (statement of Rep. Key).
254. Id.; see also id. at 280 (statement of Sen. Brent).
255. 21 ANNALS OF CONG. 1941 (1810) (statement of Rep. Key).
256. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 661 (1811) (statement of Rep. Key); see also id.
at 672 (statement of Rep. Alston).
257. See, e.g., id. at 228, 231 (statement of Sen. Pope); id. at 141–42, 144
(statement of Sen. Crawford); id. at 273, 276, 284 (statement of Sen. Brent).
258. Id. at 631–32, 634, 636, 639–40 (statement of Rep. Porter). Others
make essentially the same arguments. See id. at 676 (statement of Rep.
Wright); id. at 696 (statement of Rep. Barry); id. at 720 (statement of Rep.
Johnson); id. at 810 (statement of Rep. Rhea); id. at 180 (statement of Sen.
Giles).
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clared that bank supporters’ national sovereignty theory was so
broad that the United States would no longer have a written
guide to Congress’s powers and that it would take the United
States back to Great Britain where the constitution was found
259
in the statutes, precedents, parliamentary guide.
The “radical source” of the bank’s supporters’ error, opponents argued, was their assumption that the Constitution is “a
mere general designation of the ends or objects for which the
Federal Government was established, and leaving to Congress
a discretion as to the means or powers by which those ends
260
shall be brought about.” Bank opponents objected that bank
supporters “confound the power and the object of [the power]
together, and make the attainment of the object, and the execution of the power given to accomplish it, convertible terms.
Whatever, they say, attains the object for which any power is
261
given, is an execution of that power.” In other words, bank
supporters believed “that the execution of a power and the at262
tainment of its object, are synonymous terms.” Their theory of
Congress’s powers would enable Congress to adopt “any meas263
ure not expressly prohibited by the Constitution.” This is pre264
cisely what bank proponents argued. Bank opponents objected that the “constitutionality [of every bill] is made to depend
on its [fitness and] general tendency to promote the ultimate
objects for which these different powers were given. In other
265
words, it is made to depend on its expediency.”
C. CONGRESS’S POWER AND DUTY TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPERITY
Bank proponents argued that one of the national government’s primary duties, objects or ends, and first principles is to
promote economic development and thereby promote and se266
cure the nation’s prosperity and general welfare. Representa259. Id. at 268 (statement of Sen. Smith of Md.).
260. Id. at 636 (statement of Rep. Porter).
261. Id. at 634.
262. Id. at 634–35.
263. Id. at 644; see also id. at 652–53 (statement of Rep. Desha).
264. Id. at 660–61 (statement of Rep. Key); see also id. at 672 (statement of
Rep. Alston); id. at 780–81 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at 771 (statement of Rep. Nicholson). For Madison’s assertion of this principle in his THE
FEDERALIST NO. 44, see infra notes 451–55 and accompanying text.
265. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 645 (1811) (statement of Rep. Porter).
266. Id. at 601 (statement of Rep. Fisk); see also id. at 314–15 (statement of
Sen. Pope).
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tive Jonathan Fisk of New York, for example, insisted that the
First Bank’s continuation was an “imperious necessity” to
maintain the nation’s credit system, its agricultural, business
267
and commercial development, and its economic prosperity.
Some argued that Congress’s powers to lay and collect taxes, to
pay the debts of the United States and to provide for its general
welfare, combined with Congress’s power to pass all laws that
are necessary and proper for carrying its powers into execution
gave Congress ample power to extend the First Bank’s charter
“without calling in the aid of the general grant of powers as
contained in the Constitution—from which some gentlemen
268
seem to turn with such disgust . . . .”
Bank opponents did not disagree that government should
actively promote economic development and prosperity. But
they countered by maintaining that state and local banks could
offer any needed financial services, thus rendering the First
269
Bank unnecessary. As did their congressional predecessors,
bank opponents also insisted that the First Bank infringed
270
states’ rights and state sovereignty. They regarded the operation of the national bank and its agents in the states without

267. Id. at 602–03, 609 (statement of Rep. Fisk). For similar statements,
see id. at 670, 672 (statement of Rep. Alston); id. at 756, 759 (statement of
Rep. Garland); id. at 750 (statement of Rep. Crawford); id. at 761–62, 773–74
(statement of Rep. Nicholson); id. at 779 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at
164–70 (statement of Sen. Lloyd); id. at 220–21, 240 (statement of Sen. Pope);
id. at 276, 289, 291 (statement of Senator Brent); id. at 311, 314 (statement of
Sen. Pickering); id. at 148, 150, 345 (statement of Sen. Crawford).
268. Id. at 756 (statement of Rep. Garland); see also id. at 781 (statement
of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at 1804 (1810) and 295 (1811) (statement of Rep. Taylor); id. at 1811–12 (statement of Rep. Findley); id. at 1941 (statement of Rep.
Key); id. at 139 (statement of Sen. Crawford); id. at 275–76 (statement of Sen.
Brent); id. at 310–11 (statement of Sen. Pickering).
269. See, e.g., id. at 1797–99 (statement of Rep. Love); id. at 655 (statement
of Rep. Desha); id. at 202 (statement of Sen. Giles); id. at 245–46, 251, 258–59
(statement of Sen. Smith of Md.). For the debate on this issue, see id. at 1797–
99 (statement of Rep. Love); id. at 1804–05, 1808–09 (statement of Rep. Taylor
of S.C.); id. at 1811–12 (1810) and 703 (1811) (statement of Rep. Findley); id.
at 1943 (statement of Rep. Troup); id. at 584 (statement of Rep. Burwell); id.
at 623 (statement of Rep. Seybert); id. at 639 (statement of Rep. Porter); id. at
683 (statement of Rep. Wright); id. at 712, 716 (statement of Rep. Gold); id. at
750 (statement of Rep. Crawford); id. at 756 (statement of Rep. Garland); id.
at 764–65 (statement of Rep. Nicholson); id. at 672 (statement of Rep. Alston);
id. at 779–80 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge); id. at 791, 794 (statement of Rep.
Eppes); id. at 798–99 (statement of Rep. Stanley).
270. See, e.g., id. at 153, 154 (statement of Sen. Leib); id. at 201 (statement
of Sen. Giles); id. at 213 (statement of Sen. Clay); id. at 342 (statement of Sen.
Crawford).
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the states’ permission as a violation of state sovereignty. Some
argued that the First Bank interfered in local affairs, regulated
the rights and relations of property between citizens, exercised
the power to destroy local banks, thus creating disharmony and
conflict, and “obliterate[ing] and destroy[ing] the distribution of
271
powers between the federal and state governments.” Porter
concluded that the doctrine of implied powers “compass, at a
single sweep, all the rights of the States; and form the basis of
272
a consolidated Government.”
D. BANK SUPPORTERS ARGUE FROM PRECEDENT AND POLITICAL
PRACTICE
As did their predecessors in 1791, bank supporters cited
congressional precedent in answering opponents’ rejection of
their doctrine of inherent national sovereignty, which opponents condemned as “unknown to the Constitution, and abhor273
rent to Republicanism, and dangerous to our liberties.” Bank
supporters also argued that past political practices associated
specifically with the Bank of the United States established the
274
First Bank’s constitutionality. President Madison approved
the charter’s extension “on the ground, he said later, admitting
‘expediency and almost necessity,’ of ‘deliberate and reiterated
275
precedents.’”
E. SUPPORTERS ARGUE NATIONAL EXIGENCIES AUTHORIZE
CONGRESS TO CHARTER A BANK
Supporters also insisted that Congress may legislate to
meet national exigencies and that such exigencies rendered the
bank constitutional. For example, Representative Thomas R.

271. Id. at 645–46 (statement of Rep. Porter); see also id. at 584–85 (statement of Rep. Burwell); id. at 155 (statement of Sen. Leib); id. at 206 (statement of Sen. Giles).
272. Id. at 646 (statement of Rep. Porter); see also id. at 684 (statement of
Rep. Wright); id. at 697 (statement of Rep. Barry); id. at 717, 727 (statement
of Rep. Johnson); id. at 755 (statement of Rep. Crawford); id. at 201 (statement of Sen. Giles).
273. Id. at 799 (statement of Rep. Stanley); see, e.g., id. at 669 (statement
of Rep. Pickman); id. at 820–21 (statement of Rep. McKee); id. at 139, 144
(statement of Sen. Crawford); id. at 276 (statement of Sen. Brent); id. at 309–
11 (statement of Sen. Pickering).
274. See id. at 666 (statement of Rep. Pickman); see, e.g., id. at 712 (statement of Rep. Gold); id. at 145–46 (statement of Sen. Crawford); id. at 230
(statement of Sen. Pope); id. at 281 (statement of Sen. Brent).
275. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 210.
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Gold of Whitestown, New York proclaimed his deep conviction
that the national bank was necessary to the administration of
276
the nation’s finances and to the exigencies of war. More
broadly, Gold declared that the national government was a sovereign government, and Congress may exercise those powers
277
that are “necessary to the exigencies of the country.” Representative John Taylor of South Carolina argued that, “as we
have been told by the Secretary of the Treasury, the highest
authority in the nation, on financial affairs, that a banking institution is absolutely necessary for collecting and transferring
the revenue of the United States, I am saved the trouble of establishing the constitutionality of the Bank of the United
278
States.”
Representative Joseph Desha of Mays Lick, Kentucky, directly rebutted this argument and rejected bank supporters’
idea that expediency and constitutionality are synonymous
279
terms. In Desha’s view, this theory would render the Constitution a nullity and would leave the judgment of members of
280
Congress as the only restraint on congressional power. Supporters replied that opponents erroneously confounded the
281
means by which an end is attained with the end itself. Thus,
if a bank is useful and necessary to achieve an end or object of
government, such as the collection of taxes or the payment of
282
the public debt, then the bank bill is constitutional. If a bank
is the best mode of effectuating these powers, then Congress is
283
duty bound to establish it. Supporters argued further that
twenty years of experience with the Bank of the United States
had “evinced its’ utility to the government” in achieving its ob284
jects and ends, and so the bank should be re-chartered.

276. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 712 (1811) (statement of Rep. Gold).
277. Id.; see also id. at 1941 (statement of Rep. Key).
278. LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 458.
279. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 653 (1811) (statement of Rep. Desha).
280. Id. at 654.
281. See, e.g., id. at 660 (statement of Rep. Key).
282. Id. at 661.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 666 (statement of Rep. Pickman).
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F. BANK PROPONENTS ARGUE THAT CONGRESS MAY EXERCISE
POWERS THAT ARE NOT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITED OR EXPRESSLY
RESERVED TO THE STATES OR TO THE PEOPLE
Bank supporters asserted the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius or, the expression
of one thing is the exclusion of another, as a sound rule of construction which “governs the construction of all grants and in285
stalments in public or in private life.” This is an alternative
expression of the view that Congress may exercise those sovereign powers that are not expressly prohibited to it, or expressly
reserved to the states or to the people. Consequently, “where a
grant creates a general power and enumerates exceptions to its
exercise,” Representative Philip B. Key of Maryland opined,
“the expression and enumeration of those exceptions operate to
286
exclude all others.” Under this view, a “power” is “an authori287
ty to attain a given end.” Consequently, the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise those sovereign powers that it
does not explicitly prohibit or explicitly reserve to the states or
to the people. This principle also derives from a broad construc288
tion of the Tenth Amendment.
G. BANK OPPONENTS COUNTER THAT THE TENTH AMENDMENT
PRECLUDES IMPLIED POWERS
Opponents of re-chartering countered that the Tenth
Amendment, strictly interpreted, excludes implied powers. For
example, Representative Joseph Desha of Kentucky asserted
that the Tenth Amendment expressly prohibits the theory of
289
“constructive powers” bank proponents relied on. Congress
may exercise only those legislative powers the Constitution expressly delegated to it. He defied anyone to identify a clause in
the Constitution that would justify granting monopolies or ex290
clusive privileges, such as the national bank. Desha rejected
the doctrine of implied powers as absurd and dangerous, claim285. Id. at 660 (statement of Rep. Key).
286. Id.; accord id. at 781 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge). See infra, notes
451, 453, and accompanying text for Madison’s assertion of this principle in
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44.
287. 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 661 (1811) (statement of Rep. Key).
288. Id. at 780–81 (statement of Rep. Tallmadge); see also id. at 771
(statement of Rep. Nicholson); infra note 525.
289. Id. at 652 (statement of Rep. Desha); see also id. at 753 (statement of
Rep. Crawford).
290. Id.
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ing that he had thought the doctrine of implied powers had long
ago been exploded when the Alien and Sedition Acts were enacted under this doctrine, and the people expressed their disapproval of the doctrine by throwing the congressional majority
291
out of power. He objected that the doctrine of implied powers
destroyed the barriers of the Constitution, rendering its limita292
tions on power a “dead letter.” Representative John Rhea of
Tennessee asserted the opposite constitutional construction to
that of bank proponents. Rhea argued that since the power to
charter a bank was not enumerated in the Constitution nor
prohibited to the states or to the people, it was reserved to the
293
states and to “the people in their individual State capacities.”
After all of these arguments, the bill to recharter the First
Bank failed by one vote in the House (sixty-four to sixty-five)
and one vote in the Senate (seventeen to eighteen), with the tie294
breaking vote cast by Vice President George Clinton. The
demise of the First Bank was ill-timed, because the War of
1812 broke out shortly after it. The war demonstrated the utility of a national bank.
IV. THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 1816
A. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SECOND
BANK
Events following the demise of the First Bank led to the
creation of the Second Bank. First, the number of statechartered banks exploded. Second, the War of 1812 created a
financial crisis. In the five years between 1811 and 1816, states
chartered 175 banks, almost twice the number they had char295
tered in the twenty-year period between 1791 and 1811.
Freed from the restraining power of the First Bank in 1811,
state banks “went wild” issuing paper notes, greatly exceeding
their gold and silver reserves, depreciating the value of paper
money, and forcing the banks to suspend specie payments in an
1814 run on the banks by alarmed depositors, who were fright-

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 652–53.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 816 (statement of Rep. Rhea).
Id. at 346–47, 826.
WOOD, supra note 6, at 296.
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ened by the British raid on Washington and threatened seizure
296
of Baltimore.
The national government was also disabled by the absence
of a national bank. The government turned to state banks to
handle its financial business, but they proved to be “nearly use297
less.” Without a national bank, the national government was
unable to transfer funds across the country or to pay the escalating costs of the war. Needing $50 million to pay the government’s debts, President Madison’s treasury secretary, George
W. Campbell, was unable to borrow the needed funds, and in
November 1814 the government defaulted on the national
298
debt. With the national government bankrupt and the public
299
credit in shambles, Treasury Secretary Campbell resigned.
His replacement, Alexander Dallas, recommended that the government increase internal taxes and establish a new, enlarged
Bank of the United States to meet the country’s desperate con300
dition.
B. PRESIDENT JAMES MADISON’S TREASURY SECRETARY,
ALEXANDER DALLAS, ASKS CONGRESS TO CHARTER THE SECOND
BANK
Secretary Dallas informed Congress that the country needed a national bank to meet its financial exigencies by restoring
a specie-based national currency and a nationally circulating
system of sound bank notes, thus restoring the government’s
creditworthiness and stimulating the infusion of credit into the
301
private economy. Leading banking houses and wealthy businessmen, such as Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor, and David
Parish, instigated others to petition Congress for a new nation302
al bank.
Undoubtedly speaking for President Madison, Secretary
303
Dallas addressed the question of the bank’s constitutionality.
296. Id. at 692; see also HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 227–28.
297. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 229. The desperate condition of the nation’s currency and public credit is described by Treasury Secretary Alexander
Dallas in his Treasury Report to the House of Representatives on October 17,
1814. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 401–03 (1814) (report of Sec. Dallas).
298. WOOD, supra note 6, at 692; see also HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 229–
30.
299. WOOD, supra note 6, at 692.
300. Id.
301. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 401–03 (1814) (report of Sec. Dallas).
302. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 231.
303. Id. at 232–34.
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Madison had changed his view regarding the First Bank’s constitutionality in 1810–11 on the bases of congressional prece304
dent and political practice. The experience of the War of 1812
further convinced him that the public credit and financial
needs of the nation’s economy required a new national bank.
Thus, acknowledging that highly placed individuals had opposed the First Bank on constitutional grounds, Dallas expressed the view that changes in circumstances during and af305
ter the War of 1812 had produced changes in these opinions.
Recognizing the authority of congressional precedent, he asserted that twenty years of political practice had sanctioned the
First Bank and established with finality the bank’s constitu306
tionality. He therefore demanded that discussion and disagreement over the national bank’s constitutionality must cease
307
“and decision shall become absolute.”
Opposition in Congress to the national bank’s constitutionality collapsed. The Senate enacted a bill chartering a national
bank on December 9, 1814, without debating the question of
308
the bank’s constitutionality. Even Senator William H. Wells
of Delaware, who presented the most elaborate argument
against the bank bill in the Senate, conceded that the question
of Congress’s constitutional power to incorporate a bank was
309
“now at rest,” and he did not wish to revive it. The question
at issue, he maintained, was the “true character and just extent
310
of this authority.” The bill then went to the House of Representatives.
C. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEBATES IN 1814 ON THE
SECOND BANK’S CONSTITUTIONALITY, BUT WITH LITTLE
DISAGREEMENT
The House debates reflected wide support for a national
311
bank and for the bank’s constitutionality, but a large number
304. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 189 (1815) (message from Pres. Madison).
305. Id. at 408 (report of Sec. Dallas).
306. Id. at 409.
307. Id. at 408.
308. Id. at 126.
309. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 258–59 (1816) (statement of Sen. Wells).
310. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 259 (1814).
311. See, e.g., id. at 428 (1814) (statement of Rep. Oakley); id. at 496
(statement of Rep. Wright); id. (statement of Rep. Burwell); id. (statement of
Rep. Duvall); id. at 496–97 (statement of Rep. Stanford); id. at 497, 671–72,
676 (statements of Rep. Grosvenor); id. at 497 (statement of Rep. Wilson); id.
at 498 (statement of Rep. McKee); id. at 561, 988, 1028 (statements of Rep.

750

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:699

of legislators opposed the proposed bank on practical, financial
312
grounds. Federalists, for example, supported a national bank
and Congress’s constitutional authority to charter a bank as
they had in 1791, but they thought the proposed bank was too
313
weak and ineffectual. Nevertheless, some legislators opposed
a new national bank on the grounds that it was unconstitution314
315
al, but few made constitutional arguments against the bill.
Representative John Clopton of Virginia made an elaborate argument against Congress’s constitutional authority to charter a
second national bank, but he simply reiterated the arguments
316
asserted by bank opponents since 1791.
Statements made in the House as the debate drew to a
close indicate that congressmen believed the nation’s finances
were in desperate shape and that a national bank was an indispensable curative. The House overwhelmingly passed the
Senate bill with amendments on January 7, 1815, by a vote of
317
120 yeas and 38 nays.
D. PRESIDENT MADISON AGREES THAT THE NATIONAL BANK IS
CONSTITUTIONAL ON A THEORY OF POLITICAL PRACTICE
President James Madison vetoed the bill in January 1815.
In his veto message, President Madison conceded Congress’s

Fisk); id. at 568, 572–73 (statements of Rep. Gaston); id. at 604, 1028 (statements of Rep. Ingersoll); id. at 663–64, 665 (statements of Rep. Hanson); id. at
686–88 (statement of Rep. Miller); id. at 692 (statement of Rep. Kilbourn); id.
at 1027 (statement of Rep. Hall); id. at 1028 (statement of Rep. Alston).
312. See, e.g., id. at 428 (statement of Rep. Oakley); id. at 496 (statement of
Rep. Burwell); id. (statement of Rep. Stanford); id. at 497, 665–71 (statements
of Rep. Grosvenor); id. at 498 (statement of Rep. Post); id. at 562 (statement of
Rep. Sharp); id. at 564, 987 (statements of Rep. Gaston); id. at 1014–23
(statement of Rep. Webster); id. at 1028 (statement of Rep. Robertson); id. at
1025–26 (statement of Speaker Cheves).
313. HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 238.
314. See, e.g., 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 496, 497, 976–78 (statements of Rep.
Clopton); id. at 496 (statement of Rep. Eppes); id. at 497, 585 (statements of
Rep. Hawkins); id. at 1028 (statement of Rep. Macon); 29 ANNALS OF CONG.
1339 (1816) (statement of Rep. Randolph); id. at 1340 (statement of Rep. Hardin). But see id. at 1340 (statement of Rep. Wright) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has tacitly recognized the bank’s constitutionality by recognizing it as a
party in several cases).
315. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1339 (1816) (statement of Rep. Webster); see also
id. at 259 (statement of Sen. Wells) (reiterating the argument that an express
power to charter a national bank had been discussed and intentionally omitted
from the Constitution).
316. See 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 976–85 (1814) (statement of Rep. Clopton).
317. Id. at 1044–45.
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constitutional power to incorporate a bank on the authority of
political practice. He explained that the question of the bank’s
constitutionality was “precluded, in my judgment, by repeated
recognitions, under varied circumstances, of the validity of such
an institution, in acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the Government,” with which “the general will
318
of the nation” expressed its concurrence. Madison thereby
acknowledged the authority of political practice in resolving
questions of constitutional construction and political process, as
distinguished from judicial review, as a method of resolving
questions of constitutional construction. This represented a
180-degree shift in Madison’s position when he led the opposition to Congress’s authority to charter the First Bank in 1791.
The reasons for the President’s veto were financial. Madison stated that he did not believe the proposed bank was calculated to revive the public credit, to provide a national medium
of circulation, to aid the Treasury by facilitating the collection
319
of the revenue, or to afford the public “more durable loans.”
In short, the proposed bank bill did not meet the nation’s financial and economic needs.
E. THE MADISON ADMINISTRATION’S PROPOSAL FOR THE
SECOND BANK
On December 5, 1815, President Madison sent his annual
message to Congress. Among the subjects he discussed were
the needs to restore the public credit, to pay the debt incurred
in the War of 1812, and to establish a uniform national curren320
cy. Madison advised Congress to create a national bank to
321
achieve these goals.
Secretary Dallas sent a proposed bank bill with a letter ex322
plaining its details the very next day. The proposed bill called
for a national bank capitalized at $35 million, with Congress
authorized to increase its capital to $50 million. Its capital was
to consist of three-quarters of public stock and one-quarter of
specie. Like the First Bank, the proposed second bank was a
governmental institution for the collection and distribution of
318. 28 ANNALS OF CONG. 189 (1815) (message of Pres. Madison).
319. Id.
320. Letter from James Madison, Pres. of the United States, to Congress
(Dec. 5, 1815) (on file with the American Presidency Project), http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29457.
321. Id.
322. 29 ANNALS OF CONG. 505 (1815) (letter of Sec. Dallas).
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the government’s revenues and a private commercial bank to
accommodate “the uses of commerce, agriculture, manufac323
tures, and the arts, throughout the Union.” The bank was also “required to restore and maintain the national currency; and
324
. . . the circulation of the national wealth.”
The Second Bank, again like the First Bank, was owned
jointly by the national government and private investors. The
federal government was authorized to purchase $7 million of
325
the $35 million capitalization. Unlike the First Bank, the
President appointed five of the twenty-five Second Bank direc326
tors, including the chairman of the board of directors. The national government was both an investor in the Second Bank
and a participant in the bank’s governing structure. The board
of directors was authorized to establish branches as they
327
deemed appropriate. Each branch was to have a board of thirteen directors, and the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, was authorized to appoint the presi328
dent of each branch.
In justifying the President’s power to appoint bank directors, Secretary Dallas emphasized the bank’s dual nature as a
governmentally and privately owned and operated institution.
He contended that “[t]he National Bank ought not to be regarded simply as a commercial bank . . . created for the purposes of
commerce and profit alone, but much more for the purposes of
national policy, as an auxiliary in the exercise of some of the
329
highest powers of the Government.”
F. THE REVISED SECOND BANK BILL IN CONGRESS
The bank’s constitutionality had no prominence at all in
the debates of 1814, 1815, or 1816, particularly if one compares
330
these debates to those of 1791 and 1810–11. Thus, when he
introduced the bank bill to the House on January 8, 1816, Representative John C. Calhoun of South Carolina observed that
the issue whether Congress possessed the constitutional authority to incorporate a bank did not have to be debated be323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Id. at 506.
Id.
Id. at 512.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id. at 508.
HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 233.
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cause it had been so freely and frequently discussed that legis331
lators had made up their minds on the issue. The questions to
be addressed were the practical questions of whether and what
332
kind of bank Congress should establish.
While the constitutionality of a national bank was a settled
question generally, one important legislator took until 1816 to
change his mind. As a U.S. Senator, Henry Clay opposed extending the charter of the First Bank in 1811, in part, on constitutional grounds. In 1816, as Speaker of the House, he supported the bank and Congress’s constitutional authority to
charter it. His changed view stemmed from the theories that
Congress possesses the power to legislate to meet the nation’s
exigencies; that Congress possesses the power to fulfill “many
of the objects specifically enumerated in the Constitution,” indefinable in their nature though they may be; and his ac333
ceptance of a developmental theory of a living Constitution.
Though the Constitution never changes and is always the
same, he conceded, “the force of circumstances, and the lights of
experience, may evolve to the fallible persons charged with its
administration, the fitness and necessity of a particular exercise of constructive power to-day, which they did not see at a
334
former period.” This necessity “may not be perceived, at one
time, under one state of things, when it is perceived, at another
335
time, under a different state of things.”
336
The House passed the bank bill on March 14, 1816. The
Senate passed the bank bill with minor amendments on April
337
3, 1816 by an almost two-to-one vote of twenty-two to twelve.
The House concurred in the Senate amendments and enacted
338
the bill two days later. President Madison signed the bill into
law a week later, on April 10, 1816.
G. ECONOMIC, GEOGRAPHICAL, AND POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN
CONGRESS
The political alignments on the question of incorporating
the Second Bank in 1816 were the opposite to the alignments
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 234–35.
29 ANNALS OF CONG. 1060 (1816) (statement of Rep. Calhoun).
Id. at 1191–92 (statement of Speaker Clay).
Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 1344.
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regarding the creation of First Bank in 1791. The Second Bank
was similar to the First Bank adopted by the Federalists in
1791, and the Federalists had not changed their views on banking in 1816. Nevertheless, Daniel Webster and the Federalists
339
voted against the Second Bank. Bray Hammond characterized Webster’s and the Federalists’ opposition to the Second
Bank as captious and motivated by “partisanship rather than
340
principle.” Republican policy, on the other hand, had changed
fundamentally. The party “had got into a position where a national Bank was as essential to it as it had been to the Federal341
ists twenty-five years before.” With some exceptions in both
parties, the incorporation of the Second Bank was a Republican
342
measure enacted over the opposition of the Federalists.
343
In 1791, the
Geographical alignments also switched.
North supported the incorporation of the First Bank, and the
344
South opposed it. In 1816, the South and West established
345
the Second Bank and the North opposed it. The senators and
representatives from the states of New England and the midAtlantic opposed the Second Bank by a vote of forty-four to fif346
ty-three. Those of the southern and western states voted for it
347
by an almost two to one margin of fifty-eight to thirty. Virginia was the only southern state a majority of whose federal legislators voted against the bank, but it was a majority of one: ten
348
to eleven. The majority of legislators from only three of the
nine northern states voted for the Second Bank: New Jersey,
349
New York and Rhode Island. Hammond concluded that this
vote in 1816 was more regional than either of the votes in 1791
350
and 1811.
Unfortunately, the Second Bank was operated in a politically partisan manner. It was mismanaged and failed to comply
with its charter obligations. It did not perform its restraining

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 241.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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351

functions as a central bank. The Second Bank’s actions intensified the economic contraction that led to the economic depres352
sion and the Panic of 1819. Congress considered but ultimately rejected proposals to repeal the Second Bank’s charter in
353
early 1819.
The Second Bank engendered deep bitterness that persisted in many parts of the country long after the economic recovery that followed the depression of 1819. Senator Thomas Hart
Benton of Missouri declaimed in 1832, “[a]ll the flourishing cities of the West are mortgaged to this moneyed power. They
may be devoured by it at any moment. They are in the jaws of
the monster! A lump of butter in the mouth of a dog! One gulp,
354
one swallow, and all is gone!”
Political leaders felt justified in trying to eliminate the Second Bank by taxing the bank’s branches located in their
states. Ironically, Maryland did not tax the Second Bank’s Baltimore branch for this reason; rather, it taxed the branch to
355
raise revenue. This helps to explain the government’s decision to challenge Maryland’s tax in a test case.
V. MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND
McCulloch v. Maryland arose when James McCulloch,
cashier of the Baltimore branch of Second Bank, refused to pay
an annual tax of $15,000 or a tax of two percent on the notes
issued by the Second Bank which the state of Maryland im356
posed on any bank not chartered by the state. The case presented two questions: whether Congress possessed the constitutional authority to charter the Second Bank; and whether the
tax Maryland imposed on Second Bank was constitutional. The
case’s deeper significance lay in the fact that opposing counsel
presented to the Court for resolution the conflicting inherent
national sovereignty and state sovereignty theories of American constitutionalism that the political branches of the gov357
ernment had been debating since the First Congress.
351. Id. at 257.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 259.
354. 11 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONG. 478 (1860) (statement of
Sen. Benton); see also HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 259.
355. See HAMMOND, supra note 6, at 263 (describing the bank tax of the
Maryland legislature).
356. Id.
357. Id. at 264–65.
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The court reporter acknowledged that McCulloch’s signifi358
cance transcended the legal questions presented for decision.
The Court was to decide fundamental questions concerning the
nature of the Constitution, congressional powers, American
federalism, and national and state sovereignty.
Each side was allowed three attorneys rather than the
usual two, and oral arguments were made over ten days, Feb359
ruary 22 to 27 and March 1 to 3. The reporter summarized
360
the arguments over seventy-eight pages, just over twice the
length of the Court’s thirty-seven page opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall. Opposing counsel repeated the conflicting theories of
American constitutionalism and arguments regarding the
bank’s constitutionality that were made in the congressional
debates of 1791, 1810–1811 and 1814, 1815–1816 and in Presi361
dent Washington’s cabinet in 1791.
Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the legal gravity and
political and sectional divisiveness engendered by these issues
and the profoundly important questions of constitutional con362
struction they involved. The public also recognized the im363
portance of the questions raised in this case.
The Court affirmed national sovereignty constitutionalism
and its theory of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers that
bank supporters had argued since 1791. The Court rejected the
strict construction constitutionalism and its theory of state sovereignty argued by bank opponents in these debates. Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion closely tracked Alexander Hamilton’s
arguments, which were adopted by the bank’s attorneys, particularly by William Pinkney, whom Marshall regarded as “the

358. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 322 n.3 (1819). See
supra note 5 and accompanying text for the importance of McCulloch’s impact
on the Court’s jurisprudence.
359. Id.
360. See generally id.
361. See id. at 322–40.
362. Id. at 400–01.
363. The NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER reported that “[t]he argument has involved some of the most important principles of constitutional law which have
been discussed with an equal degree of learning and eloquence and have constantly attracted the attention of a numerous and intelligent auditory,” and
the Court’s decision “is anxiously expected.” WARREN, supra note 223, at 508
(quoting NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 25, 1819). The NILES REGISTER similarly
informed its readers that the McCulloch case “involves some of the most important principles of constitutional law and the decision is anxiously expected.” Id. (quoting NILES REG., Feb. 27, 1819).
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greatest man he had ever seen in a Court of justice.” Justice
Story, not one to give high praise, gushed over Pinkney’s argument in McCulloch: “I never, in my whole life, heard a greater
speech; it was worth a journey from Salem to hear it . . . his el365
oquence was overwhelming.” This helps to explain the alacrity with which the Court issued its decision. Chief Justice Marshall issued his opinion just four days after the end of days of
366
oral arguments.
A. POLITICAL PRACTICE AS A METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court,
first took up the question of the bank’s constitutionality. But
before he began his analysis of this issue, he asserted principles
of constitutional construction that affirmed the national sovereignty constitutionalism that First and Second Bank congressional supporters had argued since the First Congress.
The Chief Justice began his opinion by asserting that political practice is an authoritative method of interpreting the
Constitution and the constitutionality of Congress’s legislative
actions. Marshall declared that doubtful questions regarding
the powers of the people’s representatives, “in the decision of
which the great principles of liberty are not concerned . . . if not
put at rest by the practice of the government, ought to receive a
367
considerable impression from that practice.” Affirming Con364. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE,
1815–1835, at 244 (1988) (quoting SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE
TANEY, LL.D. 141 (Baltimore, John Murphy & Co. ed., 1872) (White also noted
that Pinkney’s adversary, Walter Jones, “added that ‘no such man has ever
appeared in any country more than once in a century.’” Id. at 244. Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney also lauded Pinkney many years later: “I have heard
almost all the great advocates of the United States, both of the past and present generation, but I have seen none equal to Pinkney.” TYLER, supra at 71.
365. Letter from Joseph Story to Stephen White (Mar. 3, 1819), in 1 LIFE
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 324–25 (William W. Story ed., 1851). Story
reported that “[a]ll the cobwebs of sophistry and metaphysics about State
rights and State sovereignty [Pinkney] brushed away with a mighty besom
[broom].” Id.
366. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 322, 400.
367. Id. at 401. Marshall’s opinion reflects Pinkney’s argument at 379–80,
Webster’s argument at 322–23, and Wirt’s argument at 352–53. Congressional
bank supporters used this theory of constitutional construction in support of
the First Bank bill in the First Congress. See supra notes 110–14, 145–60,
273–75, and accompanying text. Political practice is very close to the doctrine
of precedent in determining constitutional powers and individual rights in
eighteenth century Anglo-American law.
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gress’s authority to interpret its constitutional powers, Marshall declared: “An exposition of the constitution, deliberately
established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not to be lightly dis368
regarded.” This doctrine is possible only if Congress possesses
inherent sovereign powers. It is utterly impossible under strict
construction constitutionalism.
McCulloch was not the first time the Court used political
practice as an authoritative explication of the Constitution’s
369
meaning. Six days after it had decided Marbury v. Madison,
the Supreme Court unanimously decided Stuart v. Laird with
the observation “that practice and acquiescence under it for a
period of several years, commencing with the organization of
the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has in370
deed fixed the [constitutional] construction” that determined
the result.
Political practice was used as authority most recently in
NLRB v. Noel Canning, in which Justice Stephen Breyer stated
that, “[i]n light of some linguistic ambiguity, the basic purpose
of the [Recess Appointments] Clause, and the historical practice
we have described, we conclude that the phrase ‘all vacancies’
includes vacancies that come into existence while the Senate is
371
in session.” In this case, Justice Breyer cited as authority
Mistretta v. United States, which in turn quoted Justice Felix
Frankfurter’s “gloss on the executive power” theory of constitu372
tional interpretation.
Justice Frankfurter’s “gloss” theory is an extension of Chief
Justice Marshall’s approach to interpreting the Constitution by
using political practice. Frankfurter cited McCulloch for “a spacious view” of the Constitution and declared that
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in
by the Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution,
making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in
373
the President by § 1 of Art. II.

368.
369.
370.
371.
ed).
372.
(1989).
373.

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2573 (2014) (emphasis addId. at 32–33, (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (J.
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In the same case, Justice Robert Jackson articulated his
tripartite approach to interpreting constitutionality of presidential actions on the basis of the interaction between Congress
and the executive over time. Jackson derived this approach
from the same theory of constitutional construction based on
374
As a Supreme Court Justice, William
political practice.
Rehnquist explained the Court’s decision in Dames & Moore v.
375
Regan, relying on a refined version of Justice Jackson’s tripartite analysis and Justice Frankfurter’s gloss on executive
powers theory. Chief Justice John Roberts also used these theo376
ries in explaining the Court’s decision in Medellin v. Texas.
Justice Antonin Scalia recognized “constitutional practice” as
persuasive authority in United States v. Printz, when he declared that “[t]he constitutional practice we have examined
above tends to negate the existence of the congressional power
377
asserted here,” though it was not conclusive.
B. CONTEMPORANEOUS EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION AS
AUTHORITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
Political practice was of special significance in McCulloch.
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the challenged legislative
power was exercised initially by the First Congress when it
chartered the First Bank in 1791 for a period of twenty years
378
after a zealous and able legislative debate. The bank bill was
then debated in the cabinet of President George Washington
“with as much persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced, and being supported by arguments which convinced
minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast, it
379
became a law,” the Chief Justice recounted. Allowed to expire
in 1811, the short experience without the national bank exposed the government to financial embarrassments, Marshall
noted, which “convinced those who were most prejudiced
against the measure [in 1791] of its necessity, and induced the

Frankfurter, concurring).
374. Id. at 635–38 (J. Jackson, concurring).
375. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69, 674, 686 (1981).
376. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 524–25 (2008).
377. United States v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997); see also United
States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (“The long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that
the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent.”).
378. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401–02 (1819).
379. Id. at 402.
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380

passage of the present law [in 1816].” This was a not-tooveiled reference to James Madison—who, as President, signed
the Second Bank bill into law—and Madison’s Democratic Republican supporters. Having reviewed this legislative and political history, Marshall repeated the authority of political practice and consequent deferential standard of judicial review: “It
would require no ordinary share of intrepidity, to assert that a
measure adopted under these circumstances, was a bold and
plain usurpation, to which the constitution gave no counte381
nance.” Marshall added that the court would find the challenged statute constitutional even if it were a case of first impression.
C. DEFERENTIAL JUDICIAL REVIEW
Another principle of national sovereignty constitutionalism
is judicial deference to the political process in interpreting constitutional powers, with the exception of powers relating to individual liberties. From the Founding through the Civil War
and Reconstruction, the Supreme Court was deferential to
Congress—recognizing its delegated powers as broad, plenary,
and supreme—and to the political process in affirming the con382
stitutionality of federal statutes. The Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional only two federal statutes prior to the Civil
War: Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in Marbury v.
Madison and the Compromise of 1820 in Dred Scott v. Sand383
ford. It declared unconstitutional thirty-one state statutes in
this period, which supports the view that the Supreme Court’s
power of judicial review was originally understood as a federal
judicial protection of federal law from state infringements. The

380. Id. Marshall’s opinion closely tracks the banks’ history as it was recounted in the argument of Attorney General Wirt in McCulloch. Id. at 352–
54. William Pinkney curtly asserted that the question of the bank bill’s constitutionality had been waived in 1816 “as being settled by contemporaneous exposition, and repeated subsequent recognitions.” Id. at 380.
381. Id. at 402.
382. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 235 (2009); KRAMER, supra note 132; WILLIAM E.
NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 82 (2000); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 125 (1990).
383. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Court did not embark upon an activist judicial review of federal
statutes, as we understand it today, until the 1860s and 1870s.
Chief Justice Marshall grounded the Court’s deference to
Congress on the doctrine of political practice. He wrote that, in
cases such as the one before the court, in which Congress had
previously exercised the challenged power of incorporating a
bank, in which subsequent congresses affirmed the power
through supporting legislation, and in which the courts decided
cases concerning the bank as if it were constitutional without
actually deciding its constitutionality, the constitutionality of
384
the statute “can scarcely be considered as an open question.”
To declare such a legislative act unconstitutional, Marshall
385
opined, it would have to be “a bold and daring usurpation.”
Marshall said this would have been the standard of review
even if the issue were an open question. “A bold and daring
usurpation” is an extraordinarily high standard that would infrequently justify a court’s finding that a federal statute is unconstitutional.
Notably, the Chief Justice acknowledged that the power to
incorporate a national bank is not among the enumerated powers delegated to Congress in Article I. He explained, however,
that the national government’s powers greatly transcend the
powers enumerated in Article I for several reasons.
D. POWERS IMPLIED FROM THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT
One reason Marshall cited for Congress’s inherent powers
is the text of the Constitution. Unlike the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution does not expressly “[exclude] incidental
or implied powers; and [require] that everything granted [to the
national government] shall be expressly and minutely de386
scribed.” Even the Tenth Amendment does not contain the
word “expressly,” Marshall observed, but leaves the question
387
“to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument.”
384. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401 (1819). McCulloch’s attorneys
had argued this theory to the Court. See id. at 325–26 (Webster); id. at 357
(Attorney General Writ); id. at 386–87 (Pinkney).
385. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 401. Marshall suggested an equally
high standard of review in Marbury when he declared that “an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
Though he embraced state sovereignty, strict constructionist constitutionalism, Thomas Jefferson was nevertheless deferential to Congress regarding
doubtful questions of constitutionality. See MALONE, supra note 43, at 280.
386. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.
387. Id. The Tenth Amendment states: “The powers not delegated to the
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He interpreted the Tenth Amendment to mean that Congress
may exercise a power to achieve its objects or ends so long as
the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit it or reserve the
388
power to the states or to the people.
The Court’s construction of the Tenth Amendment is the
exact opposite of the construction adopted by the Supreme
389
Court today. Maryland’s attorney general, Luther Martin,
had interpreted the Tenth Amendment as it is understood today and argued that a power not delegated to the United States
nor prohibited to the states “is, therefore, reserved to the
390
states, or to the people.” The Court unanimously rejected this
reading of the Tenth Amendment. Marshall’s analysis opens
the question of what is the source of Congress’s inherent powers.
E. POWERS IMPLIED FROM THE NATURE OF A WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION
A second reason Marshall offered to explain Congress’s inherent powers is the nature of the U.S. Constitution. The Court
concluded that the nature of written constitutions generally
precludes the possibility of specifying all of the powers a government may exercise. The Chief Justice elaborated:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit and of all the means by which they
may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would,
probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, [sic] that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose
those objects, be deduced from the nature of those objects them391
selves.

United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
388. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316. The bank’s attorneys interpreted the Tenth Amendment in the same way. See, e.g., id. at 384–85
(Pinkney’s argument). See supra notes 98–105, 260–65 for citations to congressional debates on this issue.
389. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2572
(2012); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151
(2000).
390. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 374. Hopkinson argued that the
states reserve all powers “that are not expressly prohibited, or necessarily excluded.” Id. at 338.
391. Id. at 407. Marshall’s explanation parrots the view of Charles
Pinkney. See id. at 385. Attorney General Wirt held similar views. See id. at
356–57.
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Notice that the Chief Justice refers to “objects” and not
“powers” that the Constitution designates from which Congress’s unstated powers might be deduced.
Marshall attributed this understanding to the framers of
the U.S. Constitution, which he inferred from the Constitution’s text. “That this idea was entertained by the framers of
the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the
nature of the instrument, but from the language,” Marshall
392
opined. “Why else were some of the limitations, found in the
393
ninth section of the 1st article, introduced?” Article I, Section
9 is a litany of prohibitions on Congress’s legislative powers,
such as prohibiting Congress from suspending the writ of habeas corpus except in specified cases, from enacting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, and many other actions. “In considering this question, then, we must never forget, [sic] that it
394
is a Constitution we are expounding,” Marshall emphasized
in a much-quoted statement.
F. IMPLIED POWERS INHERENT IN CONGRESS AS A SOVEREIGN
LEGISLATURE
A third reason the Constitution authorizes Congress to exercise inherent powers has generally been overlooked by scholars and jurists: it is the nature of Congress as a sovereign legislature. Marshall asserted this theory of national sovereignty
constitutionalism in refuting the argument that Congress does
not possess the power to charter a corporation because the
power of incorporation is a sovereign power, and the only sovereign powers Congress may exercise are those enumerated in
395
Article I. “On what foundation does this argument rest,” Marshall asked rhetorically. He answered: “On this alone: the power of creating a corporation is one appertaining to sovereignty,
396
and is not expressly conferred on Congress.” Conceding “This
is true,” Marshall rebutted the argument by emphasizing the
sovereign nature of Congress and its legislative powers, both
expressly enumerated and inherent:

392. Id. at 407.
393. Id. Marshall’s reference is to Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.
394. Id. at 407. Marshall’s constitutional construction echoes that of Alexander Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 152–57 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
395. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 409.
396. Id.
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But all legislative powers appertain to sovereignty. The original power of giving the law on any subject whatever, is a sovereign power;
and if the government of the Union is restrained from creating a corporation, as a means for performing its functions, on the single reason
that the creation of a corporation is an act of sovereignty; . . . there
would be some difficulty in sustaining the authority of congress to
pass other laws for the accomplishment of the same objects. The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it, the
duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason,
be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that it may not
select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of effecting
the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of establish397
ing that exception.

Given Congress’s sovereignty, Marshall said the Court
could not “well comprehend the process of reasoning which
maintains, that a power appertaining to sovereignty cannot be
connected with that vast portion of it which is granted to the
general government, so far as it is calculated to subserve the
398
legitimate objects of that government.” In other words, it is to
“subserve” the federal government’s legitimate objects that
Congress may exercise its explicitly delegated and inherent
sovereign powers.
Chief Justice Marshall asserted here a doctrine of implied
powers inherent in the sovereign nature of the national government generally and of Congress specifically. In other words,
as a sovereign legislature Congress possesses sovereign legislative powers that are inherent in all sovereign governments, but
Congress is limited in exercising these powers to those ends
and objects for which it was created. These ends and objects are
stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, the powers enumerated in Article I, and throughout the Constitution.
The doctrine of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers explains why the Chief Justice repeatedly stated that Congress
possesses unenumerated powers to accomplish the objects and
ends for which the Constitution was adopted and the national
government was created instead of limiting these powers to
those that are necessarily implied in semantic definitions of the

397. Id. at 409–10. The bank’s attorneys argued inherent sovereignty constitutionalism. See id. at 323 (Webster); id. at 358 (Attorney General Wirt); id.
at 382–83 (William Pinkney). For explicit congressional sources of the inherent sovereignty theory, see supra notes 56–99, 171–83, 260–65, and accompanying text. For Alexander Hamilton’s assertion of the inherent sovereignty
theory, see supra notes 195–216 and accompanying text.
398. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 410–11.
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399

enumerated powers of Article I. Inherent sovereign powers is
the reason why political practice can become an authoritative
construction of the Constitution. It also explains why Congress
may exercise unenumerated powers to address national needs
and exigencies apart from those implied from enumerated pow400
ers.
G. CONGRESS’S INHERENT SOVEREIGN POWERS ILLUSTRATED
WITH ITS PENAL POWERS
Marshall explained the Court’s understanding of Congress
as a sovereign legislature that may exercise inherent sovereign
powers with a discussion of Congress’s penal powers. He observed that “[a]ll admit, that the government may, legitimately,
punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this [penal power] is
401
not among the enumerated powers of congress.” Indeed, Marshall declared that the power to punish violations of the law
“might be denied, with the more plausibility [than the power to
incorporate a bank], because it is expressly given in some cas402
es.” He asked, therefore, “whence arises the power to punish,
in cases not prescribed by the constitution?” And Marshall answered: “All admit, that the government may, legitimately,
punish any violation of its laws; and yet, this is not among the
enumerated powers of congress.” Moreover, Congress’s powers
“may exist and be carried into execution, although no punishment should be inflicted, in cases where the right to punish is
403
not expressly given.”

399. See supra notes 391–400 and accompanying text; infra notes 401–07,
414–21, and accompanying text.
400. See infra notes 444–91 and accompanying text.
401. McCulloch, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) at 416.
402. Id. Article I, Section 8 delegates the power to punish in two situations:
Clause 6 authorizes Congress “[t]o provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States,” and Clause 10 authorizes Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 6, cl. 10.
403. McCulloch, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) at 416–17. Marshall offered two illustrations of Congress’s unenumerated penal powers: he implied Congress’s
power to punish mail theft from the government’s “implied power” to carry the
mails on post-roads from one post-office to another, implied from Congress’s
power to establish post-offices and post-roads. The other illustration is Congress’s power to punish crimes of stealing or falsifying records or process of a
federal court, or committing perjury in such a court. “To punish these offences,
is certainly conducive to the due administration of justice,” Marshall opined,
but it is not necessary to the existence and functioning of these courts. Id.
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The reason Congress may exercise inherent sovereign penal powers, even when it is not necessary, is that “[t]he good
sense of the public has pronounced, without hesitation, that the
power of punishment appertains to sovereignty, and may be exercised, whenever the sovereign has a right to act, as incidental
to his constitutional powers. It is a means for carrying into exe404
cution all sovereign powers.” A means to carry into execution
all sovereign powers is Hamilton’s definition of “resulting”
powers, which Hamilton claimed Congress possesses in addi405
tion to powers implied from Congress’s enumerated powers.
And when may the federal government exercise its sovereign
powers? Marshall said that Congress may legislate not only to
effectuate its enumerated powers but whenever Congress
deems it necessary to achieve an object or end delegated to it by
406
the Constitution. The end or object the Chief Justice hypothesized Congress may achieve through its penal powers is the
administration of justice, which the Preamble states is one of
407
the ends for which the people created the Constitution.
H. DISTINCTION BETWEEN IMPLIED POWERS AND GREAT
SUBSTANTIVE AND INDEPENDENT POWERS IN MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND
Chief Justice Marshall clarified the nature of Congress’s
inherent sovereign powers when he explained the distinction
between these unenumerated powers and Congress’s “great
substantive and independent” sovereign powers that are enu408
merated in Article I. Their enumeration in the Constitution
identifies these powers as great substantive and independent
powers as well as some of the “objects” or “ends” for which the
409
national government was established. However, implied or
incidental sovereign powers are so numerous they could not be
410
explicitly enumerated. The power to charter a corporation,
404. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 418. Representative Elias Boudinot
used the penal power illustration in House debates relating to the First Bank
in 1791, but he said they were implied in Congress’s power to establish federal
courts. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
405. Hamilton defined “resulting powers” in his opinion on the constitutionality of the First Bank. See supra notes 203–16 and accompanying text.
406. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 411.
409. Id. at 411–13.
410. Id. at 411. The bank’s attorneys made arguments reflected in portions
of Marshall’s opinion analyzed in this section. See id. at 423–25 (Webster); id.
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though a sovereign power, Marshall explained, is not “a great
substantive and independent power” because it is not specifically enumerated like the powers to make war, to levy taxes or to
411
regulate commerce.
But, in what sense are enumerated powers “independent”
powers? Marshall’s answer is that they are ends or objects in
themselves and may be exercised independently of the other
enumerated powers and other objects or ends for which the
Constitution was adopted and the national government was established. These enumerated powers may be exercised “in any
412
They are independent also because they
case whatever.”
“cannot be implied as incidental to other powers, or used as a
413
means of executing them.”
An implied sovereign power, such as the power to charter a
corporation, on the other hand, “is never the end for which other powers are exercised, but a means by which other objects are
414
accomplished.” The power to charter a corporation “is never
used for its own sake, but for the purpose of effecting some415
thing else.” Had the framers “intended to grant this power as
one which should be distinct and independent, to be exercised in
any case whatever, it would have found a place among the
416
enumerated powers of the government,” Marshall elaborated.
This statement suggests why the enumerated powers are “great
417
substantive and independent power[s].” Having been expressly delegated to Congress, they are plenary powers that Con418
gress may exercise for their own sake. An implied sovereign
power, however, is a means to accomplish something else, such
as an “object,” an “end,” or to carry into execution some enu419
merated power. The court considered powers implied from the
sovereign nature of Congress to be a “vast mass of incidental
powers which must be involved in the constitution, if that in420
strument be not a splendid bauble.” Consequently, Marshall

at 357 (Attorney General Wirt); and id. at 384–85 (Pinkney).
411. Id. at 411.
412. See id. at 421.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 421–22 (emphasis added).
417. Id. at 411.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 421, 424.
420. Id. at 421.
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concluded, “there could be no motive for particularly mention421
ing it” in the Constitution.
I. HOW THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS A GOVERNMENT OF
LIMITED POWERS AND STILL POSSESSES A VAST MASS OF
UNENUMERATED, IMPLIED POWERS
Immediately after asserting that the Constitution necessarily encompasses a “vast mass of incidental powers,” Marshall declared that “all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be
422
transcended.” Indeed, earlier in his opinion Marshall asserted
that “[t]his government is acknowledged by all to be one of
enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only the
423
powers granted to it, . . . is now universally admitted.” But
then he also declared that a “sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion” as
to the choice of means to carry into execution the powers it confers upon Congress, “which will enable that body to perform the
high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the
424
people.”
The principle of a Constitution containing limited enumerated sovereign powers as well as a “vast mass” of incidental
sovereign powers is paradoxical. Marshall resolved this paradox in his McCulloch opinion and in one of his letters rebutting
newspaper articles published in the Richmond Enquirer attack425
ing the Court’s McCulloch opinion. Judge Spencer Roane,
writing as “Hampden” in his letters to the Richmond Enquirer,
had argued in favor of the strict construction constitutionalism
asserted by congressional bank opponents since 1791 and argued by Maryland’s counsel in McCulloch, which limited Congress’s legislative powers to those expressly delegated in Article
I and implied powers without which the enumerated powers

421. Id. at 422. The Court thus rejected James Madison’s and the congressional bank opponents’ strict construction theories of Congress’s substantial
and independent powers and of the power of incorporation as a substantial
and independent power. See supra notes 73–97 and accompanying text.
422. Id. at 421.
423. Id. at 405.
424. Id. at 421.
425. Id. at 407; A Friend of the Constitution, Letter to the Editor,
ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 1, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE
OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 161–67 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter
JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE].
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426

could not be carried into effect. This argument concluded that
there are no enumerated powers that require Congress to char427
ter a corporation to carry them into execution. Consequently,
428
the power of incorporation “is not to be taken by implication.”
The McCulloch Court rejected this strict constitutional
construction, and Chief Justice Marshall subsequently clarified
the Court’s understanding of enumerated and incidental powers in response to Hampden’s newspaper attacks on the Court’s
opinion. Marshall explained that an enumerated power is “[t]he
power to do a thing” that includes “the power to carry that
429
thing into execution.” They are “the same power, and the one
cannot be termed with propriety ‘additional’ or ‘incidental’ to
430
the other. . . . The execution is of the essence of the power.”
Marshall’s comments directly rejected Maryland’s and Hamp431
den’s conception of enumerated and implied powers. They also conflict with contemporary understandings of powers im432
plied from enumerated powers.
Marshall explained the Court’s understanding of enumerated and implied powers using the taxing power. He hypothesized that, pursuant to its power to lay and collect taxes, Congress enacts a law that lays taxes and provides for the
collection and depositing of the tax money in the U.S. treas433
ury. This law “is not the exercise of an ‘additional power’ but
434
the execution of one expressly granted.” In other words, laws
that execute the granted power “are part of the original
435
grant.”

426. Hampden, Letter to the Editor, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, June 18, 1819,
reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE, supra note 425, at 125.
427. Id.
428. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 374 (quoting Maryland Attorney
General Luther Martin).
429. A Friend of the Constitution, supra note 425, at 162.
430. Id.
431. Id. at 163 (“Hampden has been caught by the words ‘necessary,’ ‘without which,’ and ‘only means,’ . . . so as to give them a weight not given by the
author, . . . [a] great and obvious error . . . .”).
432. See United States v. Comstock, 130 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“We have
since [McCulloch] made clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and
Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular
federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated
power.”).
433. A Friend of the Constitution, supra note 425, at 162–63.
434. Id. at 162.
435. Id. at 163.
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Were Congress to enact additional laws to punish those
who refused to pay their taxes or to impose a preference on
their estates for the collection of taxes or “other collateral pro436
visions,” such laws “may be traced to incidental powers.” So,
incidental or implied powers are not essential to carry into execution enumerated powers; they are not part of the original
grant. Rather, they support and facilitate the government in
accomplishing the objectives of the enumerated powers. These
implied powers are the “vast mass of incidental powers” Marshall referred to in his McCulloch opinion when he explained
why they could not be specifically enumerated. Moreover, these
powers are sovereign powers that are inherent in government.
Thus, the Court understood enumerated powers not only as authorizations to perform some action but, more broadly, as objects and ends the national government was established to accomplish and which authorize Congress to exercise its inherent
sovereign powers to achieve. The Court correspondingly rejected Maryland’s strict construction of Article I as a list of sovereign powers and implied powers without which the enumerated
powers could not be carried into execution to which Congress is
limited in accomplishing the ends and objects the Constitution
delegates to Congress.
J. WHAT ARE THE LEGITIMATE ENDS AND OBJECTS AND DUTIES
FOR WHICH CONGRESS MAY EXERCISE INHERENT SOVEREIGN
POWERS?
This raises the question of what are the legitimate ends
and objects for which Congress may constitutionally exercise an
inherent sovereign power. Certainly they are expressed in the
enumerated powers of Article I and other provisions in the
Constitution that explicitly authorize Congress to act, such as
437
various sections of Article IV.
Chief Justice Marshall also quoted the Preamble to the
Constitution as a statement of some of the objects and ends of
the national government. He asserted that “[t]he government
proceeds directly from the people; is ‘ordained and established’
in the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained, ‘in
order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity [sic], and secure the blessings of liberty to

436. Id.
437. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating the powers of Congress); id.
art. IV, §§ 1, 3 (authorizing Congress to do certain acts).
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438

themselves and to their posterity.’” Marshall also declared
that “the government of the Union [is] sovereign with respect to
those objects which . . . [the Constitution] intrusted to it, in relation to which its laws were declared [by the Constitution] to be
439
Marshall again referenced the Preamble as a
supreme.”
statement of ends or objects in his response to Hampden’s chal440
lenge of the Court’s McCulloch opinion. Chief Justice Marshall answered:
“[B]y this new mode of amendment,” may that government which the
American “people have ordained and established, in order to form a
more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity,” become an inanimate corpse, incapable of effecting any of these ob441
jects.

The Chief Justice asserted that the Court could not understand the line of reasoning in which “a power appertaining to
sovereignty . . . [that] is calculated to subserve the legitimate
objects of that government” could not be exercised by Congress
simply because it is not explicitly delegated in its Constitu442
tion. Thus, several times Marshall declared that Congress
may exercise implied sovereign powers to accomplish an object
or achieve an end for which the Constitution was adopted and
the national government was established in addition to carry
443
into execution enumerated powers.
K. THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AS A DYNAMICALLY
EVOLVING, POWER-ENHANCING DOCUMENT
The McCulloch opinion thus described the Constitution as
a dynamically evolving, power-enhancing document whose
scope and meaning are to be determined through the actions of
the political branches of the government it established, primarily Congress. Chief Justice Marshall suggested this under-

438. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403–04 (emphasis
added); A Friend of the Constitution, supra note 425, at 160.
439. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410 (emphasis added). Congressional
proponents of the First Bank made and debated this argument in the First
Congress. See supra notes 56–105 and accompanying text.
440. A Friend of the Constitution, supra note 425, at 160.
441. Id.
442. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410–11 (emphasis added).
443. See id. at 409–12, 418–19, 423–24 (showing Marshall declaring that
Congress may exercise implied sovereign powers to accomplish an object or
achieve an end).

772

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:699

standing early in his opinion when he spoke of the nature of a
written Constitution as designating “only its great outlines . . . ,
its important objects,” and leaving “the minor ingredients
which compose those objects [to] be deduced [by Congress] from
444
the nature of th[ose] objects themselves.” He also said the
Congress would deduce its powers from its experience in meeting national exigencies as they arise from unforeseen circum445
stances over time. Understandably, Marshall declared that,
although the national government is a government of enumerated powers, which may not be transcended, “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our
446
system shall exist.” This conception of the Constitution as an
evolving framework of government explains why this question
will continue to arise.
L. THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE DELEGATES “IMPLIED”
ENUMERATED AND INHERENT SOVEREIGN POWERS
Marshall, for the most part, based his understanding of
Congress’s constitutional powers on “general reasoning,” attributing Congress’s implied sovereign legislative powers to the
nature of the written Constitution and the nature of Congress
447
as a sovereign legislature. The reasons he specified had nothing to do with the Necessary and Proper Clause. Indeed, the
Chief asserted that even “in the absence of this clause, Congress
. . . might employ those [means] which, in its judgment, would
448
most advantageously effect the object to be accomplished.”
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice declared: “But the
[C]onstitution of the United States has not left the right of Congress to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the
powers conferred on the government, to general reasoning. To its
enumeration of powers is added” the Necessary and Proper
449
Clause. In other words, the Necessary and Proper Clause explicitly authorizes Congress to exercise inherent sovereign

444. Id. at 407.
445. See infra notes 473–74 and accompanying text.
446. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
447. See id. at 407 (“[The Constitution’s] nature, therefore, requires, that
only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and
the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”).
448. Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
449. Id. at 411–12 (emphasis added).
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powers which Congress possesses even without this express
450
delegation.
Marshall evidently derived the principle of constitutional
authorization and limitation of Congress’s inherent legislative
powers from James Madison’s Federalist No. 44 and Alexander
Hamilton’s Federalist No. 23. In McCulloch, Marshall declared:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu451
tional.” The Chief Justice repeated that “any means adapted
to the end, any means which tended directly to the execution of
the constitutional powers of the government, were in them452
selves constitutional.” In other words, Congress’s exercise of a
sovereign power that is not explicitly delegated is constitutional
if that legislation is appropriate to further some end or accomplish some object the Constitution delegates to the national
government or to carry into execution one or more of Congress’s
enumerated powers, so long as the Constitution does not explicitly prohibit Congress from exercising the power or explicitly
reserve the power to the states or to the people.
Marshall’s opinion here appears directly to paraphrase
Madison’s Federalist No. 44. Madison declared that, had the
Constitution not included the Necessary and Proper Clause:
[T]here can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as
means of executing the general powers would have resulted to the
government by unavoidable implication. No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required,
the means are authorised; wherever a general power to do a thing is
453
given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included.

Note that Marshall and Madison referred both to ends and
powers as authorizing Congress’s unenumerated powers. Madison had just explained that it would have been ineffective and

450. Id. at 412–13. The Necessary and Proper Clause is the last of the powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8 and states that “Congress shall have
power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
451. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
452. Id. at 419.
453. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 285 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961). Alexander Hamilton made the same point. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23,
at 153, 155–56 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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454

impracticable to list every implied power. He punctuated the
point by asserting that, had the framers “attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means, not necessary or proper for
carrying the general powers into execution, the task would
455
have been no less chimerical.”
Chief Justice Marshall repeated his interpretation of congressional powers based on general reasoning when he ana456
lyzed the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause. However, he focused primarily, but not exclusively, on elaborating
the scope of Congress’s powers implied from its enumerated
457
powers. This emphasis was necessitated by the constitutional
interpretation asserted by Maryland’s legal counsel. Marshall
noted that they had argued that the Necessary and Proper
Clause, which he thought is literally a delegation of power, “is
really restrictive of the general right, which might otherwise be
implied, of selecting means for executing the enumerated pow458
ers.”
Conceding that the Constitution delegates sovereign powers to Congress, Maryland’s counsel insisted that the nature of
the sovereign powers delegated to Congress “is modified by the
terms of the grant under which it was given. They do not import sovereign power generally, but sovereign power limited to
459
particular cases.” Consequently, the word “necessary” controls the Necessary and Proper Clause and limits Congress’s
implied powers “to such as are indispensable, and without
which the [enumerated] power would be nugatory. That it excludes the choice of means, and leaves to Congress, in each
460
case, that only which is most direct and simple.” Thus, “the
question again recurs, whether sovereign power was given in
461
this particular case.” The answer to this question, Maryland
argued, is “whether the establishment of a banking corporation

454. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 284–85.
455. Id. at 285.
456. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419 (“[I]n the absence of this [Necessary and Proper] Clause, congress would have some choice of means. That it
might employ those which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect
the object to be accomplished. That any means adapted to the end . . . were in
themselves constitutional.”).
457. See id. at 413–18 (elaborating the scope of Congress’s implied powers).
458. Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
459. Id. at 363–67, 412.
460. Id. at 413.
461. Id. at 363.
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be indispensably requisite to execute any of the express powers
462
463
of the government?” Maryland’s answer was no.
The Court dismissed Maryland’s argument and held that
the national government is sovereign with respect to its objects
and ends to the same extent as the states are sovereign with
respect to theirs, although state sovereignty is subordinated to
464
the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court rejected Maryland’s narrow interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause because it would deprive Congress of “the choice
of means” by which it might carry into execution its enumerat465
ed powers and achieve the government’s ends and objects.
The Chief Justice offered several reasons for rejecting
Maryland’s narrow interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. First, he noted that the subject of this clause was “th[e]
great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially de466
pends.” The framers of the Constitution must have intended
“to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution” by adopting whatever means, that is, powers
that “were conducive to the end” of securing the Nation’s wel467
fare. Maryland’s narrow interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause would deprive Congress of “the choice of means”
by which it might carry into execution its enumerated powers
468
and achieve the government’s ends and objects.
Second, Marshall noted that the Necessary and Proper
Clause is part of the Article I, Section 8 delegation of powers
rather than the prohibitions of congressional powers in Section
469
9. Its terms “purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers
462. Id. at 367 (emphasis omitted).
463. Id. at 412. Walter Jones had argued that “[t]he creation of a sovereign
legislature implies an authority to pass laws to execute its given powers. This
[Necessary and Proper] Clause is nothing more than a declaration of the authority of Congress to make laws, to execute the powers expressly granted to
it, and the other departments of the government.” Id. at 366 (emphasis omitted). Jones insisted that “this clause shows that the intention of the Convention was[ ] to define the powers of the government with the utmost precision
and accuracy.” Id. Jones defined the words “necessary and proper” to mean
“indispensably requisite,” id. at 367, “to the accomplishment of the end in
view.” Id. “To give it a more lax sense, would be to alter the whole character of
the government as a sovereignty of limited powers.” Id.
464. Id. at 405–06.
465. Id. at 409–10, 413.
466. Id. at 415.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 413.
469. Id. at 419.
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vested in the government. It purports to be an additional pow470
er, not a restriction on those already granted.”
In addition, Marshall repeated his understanding of the
nature of a written constitution as a dynamically evolving,
power-enhancing framework of government which delegates to
Congress broad discretionary powers to adapt the Constitution
471
to meet changing circumstances. He intoned how the Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequent472
ly, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” To
have listed the voluminous “means by which government
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been
to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it
473
the properties of a legal code.”
It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules,
for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly,
and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have declared
that the best means shall not be used, but those alone, without which
the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the
legislature of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its
474
reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.

Marshall here again declared that Congress is the institution that must adapt the Constitution to meet changing circumstances and to provide for unforeseen national exigencies.
Marshall’s conception of the Constitution as a powerenhancing framework of government also appears to have been
475
taken from James Madison’s Federalist No. 44. In his discussion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Madison explained
why the powers conferred on the U.S. government are not limited to those expressly enumerated in the Constitution, as was
476
the case in Article II of the Articles of Confederation. Madison stated:
Had the [constitutional] convention attempted a positive enumeration
of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a complete digest of laws

470. Id. at 420.
471. Id. at 415.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 415–16 (emphasis added). But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“Between these alternatives there is no middle
ground. The constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.”).
475. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 453.
476. Id. at 284–85.
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on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too
not only to the existing state of things, but to all the possible changes
which futurity may produce; for in every new application of a general
power, the particular powers, which are the means of attaining the
object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that
object, and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the
477
same.

Madison here identified two factors that explain the government’s unenumerated powers: the numerous possibilities of
achieving the “objects” of the government as specified in its
general powers; and the government’s need to “accommodate”
its unspecified powers to changing circumstances in the future.
Recall that Madison also asserted a theory of constitutional
construction in Congress that identified Congress as the institution that is to adapt the Constitution to changing circum478
stances. As a member of the First Congress in 1789, Madison
stated that doubtful questions of constitutional construction are
to be resolved by Congress, and that questions relating to the
apportionment of powers on which the Constitution is silent are
479
to be submitted to Congress’s discretion. Madison cautioned
his House colleagues to give careful consideration to such questions because Congress’s constitutional construction “will be480
come the permanent exposition of the Constitution.”
M. POWERS IMPLIED FROM NATIONAL NECESSITY OR EXIGENCY
The Court held that national necessity or exigency is one of
481
the sources of congressional power to legislate. Several times
Marshall declared that Congress may exercise its implied sovereign powers to meet national “necessities” or “exigencies.” For
example, the Chief Justice explained that the bank statute before the court was enacted in 1816, in part, because “a short
experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive it [in 1811] exposed the government, convinced those who

477. Id.
478. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
479. Id.
480. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text; see also 1 ANNALS OF
CONG. 461–62 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison)
(discussing the apportionment of power between the branches).
481. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432–33, 435 (1920). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes grounded the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird
Treaty of 1916 and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 on national exigencies and the national government’s inherent sovereign powers to meet them.
Id.
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were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity.”
The practical necessity of the bank convinced many who had
originally opposed it on constitutional grounds of its constitutionality: “So strongly have . . . [these views] been felt, that
statesmen of the first class, whose previous opinions against it
had been confirmed by every circumstance which can fix the
human judgment, have yielded those opinions to the exigencies
483
of the nation.” This was a transparent reference to James
Madison and Democratic Republicans.
N. “NECESSITY” UNDERSTOOD AS PRACTICAL NEED OR
EXIGENCY
In a number of places in his analysis, the Chief Justice’s
use of “necessity” and “exigency” referred to the practical need
for Congress to meet a pragmatic national objective rather than
the degree of relationship between Congress’s action and its
enumerated powers. Joseph Hopkinson, arguing for Maryland,
conceded the constitutionality of the First Bank because it was
484
a practical necessity in 1791. But he insisted that the Second
Bank was not constitutional because a national bank was not
necessary in 1819, and “a power, growing out of a necessity
485
which may not be permanent, may also not be permanent.”
However, referring to the Second Bank, the Chief Justice said:
“[W]ere its necessity less apparent, none can deny its being an
appropriate measure; and if it is, the degree of its necessity, as
has been very justly observed, is to be discussed in another
486
place.” Marshall identified Congress as that other place and
stated that the determination of the need to act is a legislative
487
power and function and beyond the power of the judiciary.
The Chief Justice expressly declared that this discretion is exclusively in Congress and not the Court:
[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect
any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake here to
inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line

482. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 402 (1819) (emphasis
added). Marshall was referring to the nation’s experience in the War of 1812
and financial distress it caused, which convinced those who had been most
prejudiced against the bank in 1791 of its necessity in 1816 and induced the
passage of the Second Bank. See supra notes 295–98 and accompanying text.
483. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 422–23.
484. Id. at 331–333.
485. Id. at 331.
486. Id. at 423.
487. Id.
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which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legisla488
tive ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.

The universal understanding of McCulloch among scholars
today is that the Court established the doctrine of Congress’s
implied powers as powers derived from its enumerated powers
and recognized the constitutionality of the national bank as a
legitimate exercise of such an implied power. If this doctrine
was central to the court’s decision, one would expect Marshall
to have identified the specific enumerated power or powers
from which Congress’s power to charter the bank was implied.
It is noteworthy and, in my view decisive in understanding the
Court’s doctrine of Congress’s implied powers that Marshall did
not identify any enumerated power from which Congress’s
power to charter the Second Bank is implied. Clearly, scholars’
interpretation of McCulloch is problematic.
The analysis presented here concludes that the court understood Congress’s power to charter the Second Bank to be one
of the sovereign powers inherent in Congress to achieve the
ends or objects the Constitution delegates to the national government. Congress’s penal power is another inherent sovereign
power Marshall attributed to Congress. This analysis concludes
that the court also based the constitutionality of the national
bank on Congress’s inherent sovereign power to meet national
necessities and exigencies. Marshall’s failure to tie Congress’s
power to charter the bank to a specific enumerated power or
powers supports this analysis.
O. CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER IMPLIED FROM ITS
SOVEREIGN NATURE IN ANDERSON V. DUNN
Two years after McCulloch, the Court unanimously af489
firmed Congress’s contempt power in Anderson v. Dunn. Justice William Johnson wrote the Court’s opinion and borrowed
theories of constitutional construction from Chief Justice Marshall’s McCulloch opinion. Johnson employed the theory of
Congress’s inherent sovereign powers and the theory of the
Constitution as a power-enhancing, dynamically evolving
framework of government developed through political practice
in addition to a theory of Congress’s powers implied from enu490
merated powers.

488. Id.
489. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
490. See id. at 226.
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Justice Johnson explained that it was impossible for the
framers of the Constitution to have established “a system of
491
government which would have left nothing to implication.”
Like Chief Justice Marshall, he described the Constitution as a
power-enhancing, dynamically evolving framework of govern492
ment shaped by political experience. Johnson instructed:
The science of government is the most abstruse of all sciences; if, indeed, that can be called a science which has but few fixed principles,
and practically consists in little more than the exercise of a sound discretion, applied to the exigencies of the state as they arise. It is the
493
science of experiment.

Consequently, “the relation between the [government’s] action and the end [it is attempting to achieve], is not always so
494
direct and palpable as to strike the eye of every observer.”
This is why the “maxim” of government “which necessarily
rides over all others, in the practical application of government,
. . . is, that the public functionaries must be left at liberty to ex495
ercise the powers which the people have intrusted to them.”
And, the “interests and dignity” of the people “require the exertion of the powers indispensable to the attainment of the ends
496
of their creation.”
Johnson explained that Congress’s power to find a private
citizen in contempt of Congress is inherent in Congress and
implied from the purposes, ends, and objects for which it was
497
established. The judiciary also possesses the inherent power
to fine and imprison for contempts although the Constitution
498
does not expressly delegate it. Although the contempt power
had been conferred on the courts by statute, the statute was “a
legislative assertion of this right, as incidental to a grant of judicial power,” which the courts would have possessed in the ab499
sence of the statute. That is, the judiciary’s contempt power is
inherent in the judicial power.
The Court applied the same principle to Congress and affirmed its inherent power to punish all contempts of Congress
even though the Constitution delegates to Congress the power
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Id. at 225.
See id.
Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 227–28.
Id.
Id.
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to punish only its own members for misbehavior in Congress.
Anderson had argued that the Constitution, in delegating to
Congress the power to punish only its own members precludes
Congress from punishing ordinary citizens for alleged actions
501
outside of Congress. Johnson rejected the argument on “the
502
ground [that it] is too broad, and the result too indefinite.” He
explained that this “argument obviously . . . annihilat[es Congress’s power] to guard itself from contempts, and leaves it exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, ca503
price, or even conspiracy, may meditate against it.” That
Anderson was a private citizen and not a member of Congress
and that he committed his offense outside of Congress and not
504
on the floor of Congress made no difference. “For why should
the House be at liberty to exercise an ungranted, an unlimited,
and undefined power within their walls, any more than without
505
them,” Johnson queried rhetorically.
Like Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Johnson asserted
Congress’s inherent sovereign power to affirm Congress’s
unenumerated penal powers. He rejected the argument “that
the express grant of [Congress’s] power to punish their members . . . raises an implication against the power to punish any
506
other than their own members.” Johnson replied that “[t]his
argument proves too much, for its direct application would lead
507
to the annihilation of almost every power of Congress.” Consequently, “all the punishing power exercised by Congress in
any cases, except those which relate to piracy and offences
508
against the laws of nations, is derived from implication.” It
never occurred to anyone “that the express grant in one class of
cases repelled the assumption of the punishing power in any
509
other.” “The truth is,” Johnson opined, giving the power to
punish Congress’s own members “was of such a delicate nature,
that a constitutional provision became necessary to assert or
500. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (providing in relevant part that “[e]ach
house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member”).
501. Id. at 232–33.
502. Id. at 228.
503. Id.
504. Id. at 226–27.
505. Id. at 229.
506. Id. at 232–33.
507. Id. at 233.
508. Id.
509. Id.
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510

communicate it.” But all assumed that Congress possessed
the power to punish any other violator of its laws, Johnson de511
clared. Like Marshall, Johnson asserted a theory of Congress’s penal powers as inherent in Congress’s nature as a sovereign legislature.
Justice Joseph Story echoed Marshall’s reasoning when he
explained the theory of Congress’s inherent sovereign powers in
his 1833 treatise, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
512
United States. Story called this “sort of implied power” by the
same name used by Alexander Hamilton in his opinion on the
513
bank, namely, a “resulting power.” Citing to Hamilton’s opinion on the bank, Story defined resulting powers as those “aris514
ing from the aggregate powers of the national government.”
Story instructed that a resulting power is more “a result from
the whole mass of the powers of the national government, and
from the nature of political society, than a consequence or inci515
dent of the powers specially enumerated.” Story offered several examples of these powers and declared that they are “natural incident[s], resulting from the sovereignty and character of
516
the national government.”

510. Id.
511. Id. at 226.
512. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 124–25 (1833) [hereinafter STORY COMMENTARIES].
513. Id. at 124; see supra notes 202–16 and accompanying text (discussing
Hamilton’s theory of resulting powers).
514. STORY COMMENTARIES, supra note 512, at 124.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 124–25 (citing Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172,
181 (1818) (holding that the United States government has the right to enforce
all contracts to which it is a party or “to recover damages for their violation, by
actions in . . . [its] own name,” even though this power is not delegated to it or
conferred by statute); United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115, 128 (1831)
(“[Justice Story declaring that] we are of opinion that the United States have
such a capacity to enter into contracts. It is in our opinion an incident to the
general right of sovereignty; and the United States being a body politic, may,
within the sphere of the constitutional powers confided to it, . . . enter into
contracts not prohibited by law . . . . To adopt a different principle, would be to
deny the ordinary rights of sovereignty.”); United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 336, 390 (1818) (“[A] government which possesses the broad power of
war; . . . has power to punish an offence committed by a marine on board a
ship of war, wherever that ship may lie.”); Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145–46 (1812) (holding that “a principle of public law”
mandates “that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power
open for their reception are to be considered as exempted by the consent of
that power from its jurisdiction,” unless the sovereign destroys the immunity
and exercises jurisdiction over such ships).
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The Supreme Court grounded Congress’s power to issue
paper currency on a theory of inherent sovereign powers in the
Legal Tender Cases four decades later. Justice William Strong,
writing for the Court, explained “that important powers were
understood by the people who adopted the Constitution to have
been created by it, powers not enumerated, and not included
517
incidentally in any one of those enumerated.” He cited the
518
519
Suspension Clause and the Bill of Rights, which deny to
Congress powers that were not expressly granted and could not
be implied from any other powers, as evidence “that, in the
judgment of those who adopted the Constitution, there were
powers created by it, neither expressly specified nor deducible
from any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone, but which
grew out of the aggregate of powers conferred upon the gov520
ernment, or out of the sovereignty instituted.” Justice Strong
maintained that Congress had often exercised such inherent
sovereign powers and noted that Justice Joseph Story, in his
Commentaries on the Constitution, characterized such powers
as “resulting powers, arising from the aggregate powers of the
521
government.” Strong also could have cited Story’s source, Alexander Hamilton.
The Supreme Court has recognized the national government’s inherent sovereign powers in other areas of law, such as
522
foreign affairs, eminent domain, and immigration.
P. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND STATES’ RIGHTS ARE SUBORDINATE
TO NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
In deciding the second issue presented in McCulloch,
whether Maryland’s tax on the Second Bank was constitution517. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 532–39 (1870).
518. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”).
519. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
520. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 535; see also id. at 555–56,
561–64 (Bradley, J., concurring) (discussing the delegation of powers to Congress).
521. Id. at 535.
522. See Andrew Kent, The New Originalism and the Foreign Affairs Constitution, 82 FORDHAM. L. REV. 757, 775 (2013) (recognizing national government’s inherent sovereign powers); Thomas H. Lee, The Supreme Court of the
United States as Quasi-International Tribunal: Reclaiming the Court’s Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction over Treaty-Based Suits by Foreign States
Against States, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1765, 1833 (2004) (recognizing national
government’s inherent sovereign powers).
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al, Marshall asserted a doctrine of constitutional federalism
that recognized the supremacy of national sovereignty over
state sovereignty. Significantly, he acknowledged that a state’s
power to tax is “one of vital importance,” that it “is essential to
the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost ex523
tent to which the government may chuse [sic] to carry it.”
Nevertheless, the Court held that “the sovereignty of the
State, in the article of taxation itself, is subordinate to, and
524
may be controlled by the constitution of the United States.”
The Court declared the state of Maryland’s tax unconstitutional
on the basis of “[t]his great principle . . . that the [C]onstitution
and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they
control the [C]onstitution and laws of the respective States, and
525
cannot be controlled by them.” Marshall declared Maryland’s
tax unconstitutional on the principle of the supremacy of national sovereignty. He explained:
It is of the very essence of [governmental] supremacy to remove all
obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every
power vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence. This effect need not be stated in
terms. It is so involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily
implied in it, that the expression of it could not make it more certain.
We must, therefore, keep it in view, while construing the constitu526
tion.

Q. REPRESENTATIVES’ ACCOUNTABILITY TO CONSTITUENTS
CHECKS ABUSE OF POWER
Chief Justice Marshall also applied the popular sovereignty and republican theories of government to explain why a
state’s tax on a national institution is unconstitutional. The
state legislature derives its authority to tax from the people of
the state, and it is the influence of the legislators’ constituents
over them that guards their constituents against the abuse of
527
the taxing power. But the institutions created by the national
528
government “have no such security.” “Those . . . [institutions]
are not given by the people of a particular State . . . which
claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the States.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425, 428 (1819).
Id. at 427.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428.
Id.

2016]

INHERENT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

785

They are given by all, for the benefit of all—and upon theory,
should be subjected to that government only which belongs to
529
all.” The people of a single state cannot delegate to the state’s
legislature the power to tax “those means which are employed
by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that
530
body by the people of the United States.” In Congress “alone,
are all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling
measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be
531
abused.” Note that Marshall based this ruling on the assumption that the remedy for the abuse of the taxing power was the
political process in which legislators are held accountable to the
people in elections, not judicial review.
The theories Chief Justice Marshall espoused in McCulloch
are extraordinary to the twenty-first century reader. But, they
were familiar to Americans familiar with the debates relating
to the First Bank and Second Bank in 1791, 1810–11, 1814–16.
The Court’s decision did not end the political partisanship surrounding the Second Bank, and the opposition to it persisted.
The Second Bank was eventually “killed” by President Andrew
Jackson in the 1830s. But that story must be left to another
time.
CONCLUSION
This Article presents a detailed analysis of the constitutional theories argued in the legislative histories of the First
Bank and Second Bank of the U.S. and in the Supreme Court’s
decision affirming the constitutionality of these institutions.
This analysis demonstrates that inherent national sovereignty
constitutionalism played an important role in the creation of
these national banks and a decisive role in the Court’s McCulloch decision upholding Congress’s power to incorporate them.
The evidence shows that the current, predominant interpretation of the original understanding of the Constitution and of
the Court’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, that they established a national government of a few enumerated powers, is
incomplete, inaccurate and, in many respects, contradicted by
the historical evidence.

529. Id. at 428–29.
530. Id. at 429.
531. Id. at 431.
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The historical evidence establishes that inherent national
sovereignty constitutionalism was a theory of the Constitution
as prevalent and as influential in shaping and supporting the
governance of the early republic as the constitutional theory of
strict construction. The constitutional debates that arose in the
nation’s early history between advocates of these conflicting
theories, the decisions they made consistent or conflicting with
these theories, the court decisions that decided questions of law
arising from these theories and political decisions demonstrate
beyond cavil that the original meaning of the Constitution was
not fixed, as today’s new originalists insist, but was tentative,
open-ended, and ever evolving.
Proponents of national sovereignty constitutionalism thus
defined the Constitution as a developmental, dynamicallyevolving framework of government which centered governing
power primarily in Congress. Because they assumed that Congress’s unenumerated powers to achieve the national government’s ends and objects are vast and vary with changing circumstances, the Constitution could not possibly specify all of
the powers Congress might exercise to fulfill its responsibility
to provide for the nation’s needs and welfare. They understood
the Constitution as an outline of government and governmental
powers, and its meaning was to evolve over time within the political process of governing through the actions of the political
branches of government. Consistent with the theory of popular
sovereignty and republican political theory which underlie the
Constitution, they insisted that Congress has the primary responsibility and authority to interpret the Constitution’s meaning and the extent of the national government’s powers because
the people delegated their sovereign lawmaking power and the
primary responsibility to provide for the nation’s welfare to
Congress. The Court is to defer to these judgments and to set
them aside only if they are unequivocally contrary to the Constitution or relate to individual rights.
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland
shows that the Supreme Court unanimously adopted this inherent national sovereignty theory of the Constitution. As noted within, the Court affirmed this theory in many other decisions as well. The Court also expressly rejected the strict
construction theory of the Constitution, consisting of fixed powers semantically understood, that is the prevailing constitutional theory of the Supreme Court’s conservative Justices and
of political conservatives.
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Inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism is fundamentally different from today’s understanding of the Constitution, of the constitutional/political process, and of the relationships of the branches of government within the constitutional
structure. It entrusts much greater autonomy to Congress and
the executive to govern and much greater authoritativeness to
Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution in its function to
make law and public policy than our system today allows. It
envisions a more modest role for the judiciary in reviewing
Congress’s legislative actions and the policies they entail. This
theory centers policy making in the political branches of the
government rather than in the Supreme Court where it currently exists. Moreover, inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism relegates constitutional interpretation in making political decisions to a less important role and requires decision
makers to justify their actions on their practical merits instead
of the Constitution’s meaning. In short, inherent national sovereignty constitutionalism presents a fundamentally different
understanding of the way government should function under
the Constitution.
Although the constitutional/political system that the
founders established is fundamentally different than today’s,
according to a developmental theory of the Constitution, today’s
system should be different than it was originally. But scholars
and jurists should become aware of how the system has
changed in order to assess which of these changes are worthwhile and defensible and which are not.

